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Trade Union 
leader executed in secret 
After 18 years in prison 
Mohammed Munir 
The former chairman of the All-Indonesia Trade Union Federa-
tion (SOBS!) Mohammed Munir, was executed in Jakarta on 14 
May, 13 years after being sentenced to death and 18 years after 
being arrested. Some 15 years have passed since the Suharto re-
gime last executed a political prisoner convicted in connection 
with the events of October 1965. 
The news of Munir's execution has come as a great shock. It is 
an act of gross inhumanity for the Indonesian authorities to have 
proceeded with an execution after the convicted person has suf-
fered the hardships of incarceration and separation from his fam-
ily for so many years. 
The execution took place under conditions of secrecy and in 
great haste. It has not been reported in the Indonesian press. A 
last request by Munir that he be allowed to meet his wife was not 
granted because his wife lives in Surabaya, East Java and the au-
thorities would not postpone the execution to give her time to 
travel to Jakarta. Munir was therefore only able to say farewell 
to more distant relatives living in Jakarta. 
STOP PRESS 
Munir's execution places in jeopardy the lives of other political 
prisoners tried and sentenced to death in the early and mid 
1970s. An Indonesian press report in April announced that pre-
parations were being made for three former leaders of the In-
donesian Communist Party to be executed after clemency pleas 
on their behalf, submitted several years ago, were turned down 
by General Suharto, the Indonesian president. (See page 2) . 
T APOL has called on the British Government to condemn the 
execution of Munir at the meeting of the international aid con-
sortium, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, to be 
held in Amsterdam on 4-5 June. It has also urged the British 
Government to use this opportunity to ask the Indonesian Gov-
ernment not to proceed with further executions in the interests 
of humanitarianism. 
Mohammed Munir was born on 27 October 1925 in Madura. 
He founded the Automobile Workers. Union in 1947 and was 
also active in the Union of Shipping Workers . In 1950, he be-
came chairman of the Jakarta branch of the All-Indonesia Trade 
Union Federation (SOBSI) and later served the Federation at a 
national and international level. At the last SOBSI congress be-
fore it was banned in October 1965, Munir was elected chairman 
of the SOBSI National Council. He attended many international 
gatherings, among others, the International Transport Confer-
ence in 1952. He also became amember of the World Federation 
of Trade Unions general council. 
He was arrested during an army raid in South Blitat, East Java 
where many members of trade unions and other banned organi-
sations had gone into hiding to evade arrest during the nation-
wide mass arrests that foll0,wed the military takeover in 1965. He 
was sentenced to death. in Jakarta in 1973. His High Court ap-
peal against sentence was not rejected till November, 1981 and 
his Supreme Court appeal was not heard because the . Court 
claimed the period for submission had lapsed. His wife pleaded 
on his behalf for presidential clemency in May 1983 but this too 
was rejected. · 
A two-way radio link-up with Fretilin inside East Timor has been opened in Australia. In the first official communication, 
ABC reporter Mark Aarons and Australian politicians interviewed Mau Hunu, deputy commander of Falintil, the armed 
resistance movement. A mass of information about conditions inside East Timor has been received through the link-up 
and will be reported in the next issue of TAPOL Bulletin. 
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Death sentences 
Long term prisoners' lives in danger 
Gatot Lestario (Sutaryo) and Djoko Untung, both members of 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) who were sentenced to 
death in 1976, still face the threat of execution even though the 
Indonesian government gave an assurance last November to the 
Dutch government that the executions would not be carried out 
(see TAPOL Bulletin No 67, January 1985). A third PKI pris-
oner, Rustomo, sentenced to death over ten years ago, in 
January 1976, is also in danger of execution. His plea for cle-
mency was turned down by the president last December. 
On 12 April , Kompas reported that Major-General Djat-
mika, Police chief for East Java, was making preparations for 
the execution of the three men and was only awaiting the permit 
of the Minister of Justice who would be the one to decide where 
the executions would take place. Djatmika announced that he 
had asked the public prosecutor's office to prepare a firing squad 
and a team of doctors, ready for the execution. 
Since news of these preparations was received , there have 
been many pleas on their behalf to the Indonesian authorities, 
and as far as TAPOL is aware, no executions have taken place. 
Readers wishing to support the campaign to save these men's lives 
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Three more prisoners to be executed 
• The Age (Melbourne) reported on 29 May that the 
Indonesian Embassy in Canberra has confirmed that 
Gatot Lestario, Djoko Unting and Rustomo are due to 
be executed. 
• In a wave of protests in Holland, there have been calls on 
the Dutch government to postpone the meeting of the 
Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), due to 
take place in Amsterdam on 4-S June. AU political 
parties have called on the Dutch government to condemn 
Munir's execution in the strongest terms. 
• In Australia, Sir Gareth Evans, spokesman for the 
Foreign Department, told the Senate of his 
government's deep dismay over Munir's execution. 
• In a letter to the British government, Lord A vebury, 
chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, 
has called on the government to condemn ''this barbaric 
act" at the IGGI meeting. 
Hotline Asia Oceania of the Hongkong-based Centre for the 
Progress of Peoples, has called upon around 250 groups in all 
parts of the world to urge the Indonesian president to give the 
three prisoners clemency. Only if the three men are granted cle-
mency will their lives be safeguarded and will they be able to 
hope for release from prison. 
Rustomo 
Now 65 years old, Rustomo was former deputy General Secret-
ary of the East Java Provincial Committee of the PKI. He was 
arrested in May 1968, tried in late 1975, and sentenced to death 
in January 1976. He was accused of attempting to establish PKI 
influence within the Armed Forces prior to October 1965 and of 
being involved in the October 1965 events in Jakarta. (Informa-
tion about Djoko Untung and Gatot Lestario was published in 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 66, November 1984.) 
Ruslan Widjayasastra 
Another death sentence prisoner now at risk is Ruslan Wid-
jayasastra whose clemency plea was rejected at about the same 
time as Munir's . Ruslan was a member of SOBSI's National 
Council and second vice-chairman of its Central Bureau. Like 
Munir, he was arrested in South Blitar in 1968, then tried and 
sentenced in July 1974. 
Rosian Widjaysastra, in court, as the death sentence was 
announced (Sinar Harapan, 4.6.74) 
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Investigation of a massacre 
On 12 April, a court in Jakarta passed sentences of 1 to 3 years 
against 28 men accused of participating in a demonstration last 
September in Tanjung Priok . The men were accused of "waging 
resistance with violence" against the Indonesian Armed Forces . 
Many of the defendants had been seriously wounded when 
troops opened fire on them. Some were crippled for life, others 
still had bullets lodged in their bodies. Some were too ill to sit up 
during the proceedings . Sessions were frequently interrupted 
when members of the public wept at the sight of these 
unfortunate men. 
When the incident occurred last year, there were calls for a 
public inquiry, but no inquiry was ever held. Instead, the victims 
of the massacre, not the perpetrators, were put on trial. Enough 
has appeared in the Indonesian press however to show that most 
of the evidence heard in court strongly challenged the Army's 
version of the incident. T APOL has therefore decided to 
reproduce at length evidence presented during the trial which 
must rank as one of the most grotesque travesties of justice in 
Indonesian legal history. 
The following account does not claim to be complete . No 
defence documents have yet been made available, only press 
reports which in many respects are of limited value. Since the 
trial was held to legitimise the version of the massacre 
pronounced the morning after by General Benny Murdani, 
Commander of the Armed Forces, Indonesian newspapers were 
wary of publishing too much about the case for the defence. The 
Catholic daily, Kompas, provided the fullest reports, but even 
these were sketchy and far from complete, leaving many things 
unexplained. The Golkar daily Suara Karya published reports at 
variance on many points with reports in Kompas and other 
papers. Much of what Suara Karya reported was not based on 
what transpired in the courtroom; it appears to have been based 
on pre-trial interrogation reports even though most of these were 
retracted by the defendants in court. 
The following account is further complicated because, until 
sentences were passed, all the defendants were identified only by 
initials. When their full names were published at the end of the 
trial, it was not always easy to identify the convicted men with 
their initials. 
Most of the press clippings used below are from Sinar 
Harapan and Kompas. For some of the Kompas clippings and all 
references to Suara Karya, we relied on the logging of the trials 
published in Indonesia Reports for March 1985. 
The Tanjung Priok massacre 
On 12 September, a public meeting took place in Sindang Road, 
Rawabadak, Tanjung Priok to protest against the detention of 
four local inhabitants. After hearing speeches by several 
informal leaders including Amir Biki who was shot dead later 
that evening, the crowd divided into two groups and marched to 
the local police and army headquarters to demand the release of 
the four men. General Murdani's account of what happened next 
was broadcast by Radio Republic Indonesia the next day and 
reads as follows: 
Murdani's Account 
"After that, a 1,500-strong mass, some of them armed with chopping 
knives, sickles, crowbars and fuel, began marching to the 
headquarters of the security forces. Seeing this dangerous 
development, a unit of security forces, consisting of 15 persons, tried 
to prevent and obstruct the movement of the mob. 
"The security unit made efforts to break up the mob by using 
persuasion. However, they answered with yells of "No compromise"! 
With the yells inciting the emotion of the masses, they pushed the 
security unit while swaying and raising up their sickles. When they 
were within a dangerous distance, the security unit began firing 
warning shots in the air. Because the mob did not obey, the security 
unit directed the shots into the ground and at the legs of the 
attackers. As such, casualties were inevitable. 
"It was only after the arrival of other security units that the mob 
withdrew. . . Less than 30 minutes later, the mob attacked the 
security units again. Under such critical conditions, the security units 
were forced to shoot in order to prevent them from seizing weapons 
and to foil further attacks with sickles or other sharp objects ... 
"The victims have received due treatment. The government has 
conveyed its condolences to the families of the victims." (AFP, 13 
September 2984.) 
According to Murdani, on 13 September, 9 people were 
killed and 53 injured. On 3 October, he said the number of dead 
had risen to 18. This figure apparently includes not only people 
shot dead by the troops but also the victims of a fire that 
destroyed a Chinese shop which, the government alleges, was an 
act of arson by demonstrators. 
Eye-witness accounts 
TAPOL (January 1985, No.68) compiled the following summary 
based on documents compiled from eye-witnesses that circulated 
in Indonesia after the Tanjung Priok affair. The fullest report, 
dated 20 September 1984 (23 Zulhijjah 1404 H), from Al Araf 
Mosque, was entitled "Bloody Wednesday Night in Tanjung 
Priok". (For the full text of this report, see Politics Supplement, 
Indonesia Reports, 15 January 1985.) 
* A large, unarmed crowd then marched to the local army and 
police offices to press their demand. Speeches at the rally had 
been relayed by loudspeakers over a wide area, as is the 
practice. By the time the m~rchers began, the streets were 
lined with heavily-armed troops. 
* The demonstrators were stopped short by a company of air 
artillery troops which has barracks in the area, and by three 
truckloads of troops armed with automatic weapons. Without 
warning, the troops fired direct into the crowd. Hundreds fell. 
Some of the injured who rose to their feet were killed by 
bayonets. Bystanders who tried to help the injured were shot. 
* Apart from a few of the injured who got away to local 
hospitals, local inhabitants were prevented from retrieving 
the bodies or helping the injured. Soon after the massacre, 
army trucks arrived to haul off the bodies and remove the 
injured, all of whom were transported to the Army Hospital 
in Jakarta. All other hospitals were instructed not to accept 
any casualties from the tragedy. Fire engines soon arrived on 
the scene to wash away all signs of blood on the street. 
* The most comprehensive account of the massacre puts the 
number of dead at 63 and the number of seriously wounded at 
over a hundred. The speed of the Army's cover-up operation 
explains why estimates of the casualties have been so difficult 
to confirm. 
.. General Benny Murdani, Armed Forces Commander-in-
Chief was present throughout the operation, watched its 
progress with Major-General Tri Sutrisno, Jakarta Military 
Commander, and is reported to have walked over the 
sprawled bodies of the dead and injured. 
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The trial 
The indictment 
The 28 defendants were accused of waging violent resistance , 
together with others not yet arrested , against the Armed Forces . 
They were said to have been armed with knives , sticks , 
crowbars, choppers , sickles and cans of petrol for arson attacks . 
Security forces obstructed their path and advised them to stop. 
They fired warning shots but regardless of this , the defendants 
and others threw stones , and struck and clubbed the security 
forces . Prior to the attack , they had attended a lecture meeting 
to hear the late Amir Biki and others speak. They then formed 
themselves into two groups to attack the local command posts of 
the police and the army, in order to release persons who were 
under detention . The defendants were also accused of engaging 
in activities of a political nature, displaying posters to disrupt 
public order and conducting a political demonstration , in breach 
of the 1963 anti-subversion law. 
The Defence Team's protest 
Following the indictment, defending lawyers Nursyamsi, H.C. 
Princen, H . Dault and Thomas Abon submitted a demurrer 
(eksepsi) complaining that most of the defendants had been 
seriously injured by forces of the State during the Tanjung Priok 
incident. They asked the court to arrange for the defendants to 
receive proper medical treatment. Some, they argued, should be 
allowed home under house arrest as they were in need of 
intensive care . The defence also objected to violations 
committed by the arresting authorities who had acted in breach 
of the Procedural Code (KUHAP). 
The prosecutor denied that arrest procedures had been 
violated . He said the arrests were made in conformity with the 
procedures of the army security command, KOPKAMTIB which 
requires an arrest to be recorded in a document that is signed by 
the detainee . 
All the objections and requests of the defence were rejected 
by the court. 
The case of the Prosecution 
All the prosecution witnesses were members of the army or the 
police; most were men in command of the units that fired on th~ 
demonstrators Their evidence conformed with the Murdam 
account , claiming that the demonstrators ignored warning shots 
and advice to stop advancing on the security forces. One claimed 
that demonstrators had tried to seize his weapon. Their troops 
had first fired into the air and only after the crowd continued to 
press forward did they shoot down at people 's feet. Two of the 
witnesses who commanded units that fired on the crowd were 
asked how many casualties had fallen but both said they did not 
know . None was able to identify any of the defendants as having 
been among their attackers , though one witness said he 
recognised eight defendants whom he saw in hospital when they 
were arrested. One witness was a police spy who attended the 
Sindang Road meeting incognito, then claimed he rushed to 
report to his office about plans to attack the police headquarters. 
Although demonstrators were said to have attacked members 
of the security forces with their weapons , no one claiming to 
have been wounded in this way appeared at the trial. One officer 
who claims he was stabbed by a sharp instrument was unable to 
attend because he was, according to the prosecutor, still under 
treatment, so the court had to be satisfied with written evidence 
only . By contrast, the prosecution always made sure all the 
defendants were present in court despite their weak physical 
condition. 
The prosecution submitted a number of weapons as exhibits. 
These were said to have been confiscated at the location of the 
incident, though no evidence was produced that any of these 
weapons were confiscated from, or indeed the property of, any 
of the defendants . None of the defendants recognised any of the 
weapons. The only exhibit they showed recognition of was a 
green flag, though it was not the one carried at the 
demonstration because it was a different size . 
The evidence of the def end ants 
Hendra Sjafri, 22 years, a student at the Customs and Excise 
Academy, was sentenced to three years. 
Hendra was arrested on 20 September in Lampung while on a 
visit to his grandmother. His charge sheet alleged that he had 
"violently resisted officers". 
Hendra was not present at the evening meeting in Tanjung 
Priok nor did he take part in the demonstration demanding the 
release of four detainees. After attending a P-4 (Pancasila 
indoctrination) course at his Academy, he returned home for a 
meal then went to a friend's home and spent the rest of the 
evening until 11.30 playing cards. They were some two 
kilometres from the scene of the incident and did not hear the 
gunfire. Two friends who played cards with him testified as 
witnesses in support of his statement. Nevertheless, Hendra was 
found guilty and given the heaviest sentence. 
There appear to be two reasons for Hendra's selection as the 
prime culprit. First is the charge that when in Lampung, he 
delivered a lecture at a local mosque in which he allegedly 
mentioned the Tanjung Priok incident. In his own testimony, he 
denied this and said while in Lampung he was asked to address 
an assembly of children, and spoke about the need to study hard 
and to obey one's parents. He said nothing about Tanjung Priok. 
In addition, prosecution witness, Lieutenant Rein Kano, sub-
district military commander, alleged that Hendra was the only 
one of all the defendants whom he knew and who, he said, was 
"close to" Amir Biki both before and during the incident. "Close 
to" before apparently means a close friend, whereas "close to" 
during the incident seems to imply standing close to the main 
speaker at the Sindang Road meeting. The fact that the defence 
produced two witnesses to testify that Hendra was two 
kilometres away, playing cards, did not weigh at all with the 
court. 
Hendra was one of the defendants who spoke in his own 
defence after the prosecution had demanded a sentence of five 
years. He was particularly bitter at being singled out for the 
harshest sentence and protested at the trial being referred to as 
"The case of Hendra and company". 
Despite the evidence given in court by Hendra and reported 
fully in Kompas, the GOLKAR daily Suara Karya distorted his 
evidence and had him saying that he listened to Amir Biki's talk, 
that he watched the demonstration though did not take part, and 
Sindang Road after the massacre (Tempo, 22.9.84) 
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that he went to Lampung on 28 September (he was in fact 
arrested there eight days earlier!) and talked to the children 
there about the Tanjung Priok incident. 
Musolih bin Marzuki, 25 years, was sentenced to 27 months. 
Musolih, like almost every other defendant in this trial , 
withdrew the official record of his pre-trial interrogation which 
he had signed. "If the prosecutor had seen how (the defendants) 
were interrogated beyond the limits of humanitarianism, he 
would certainly agree with us in retracting our interrogation 
depositions", he told the court. 
The only press report available about Musolih's testimony 
appeared in Suara Karya which claimed that Musolih confessed 
that he listened to Amir Biki's speech, then, as "ordered" by 
Biki, he and others went to free the four detainees, damaging 
Chinese shops and homes on the way . 
Marwoto, 25 years, was sentenced to 27 months. 
He gave graphic testimony of the brutal behaviour of the 
troops towards the demonstrators. He told the court that he had 
listened to one of the speakers at the meeting before the 
demonstration, but did not join them on the demonstration as it 
was already very late. However, since the road was jammed, he 
was carried along with the crowd and had to abandon his cycle . 
On hearing continuous gunfire from the police station, he fell to 
the ground and lay prone in a drainage ditch. An AFP report 
goes further than the Indonesian press and reports Marwoto as 
saying that the army trucks drove into the crowd heedless of the 
people lying on the pavement, running over many of them. 
He only got up from the ditch when approached by a police 
officer, and was immediately arrested. He was taken to the local 
military post and beaten there. Asked by the judge about his 
interrogation report, he said that he retracted the whole thing: "I 
don't know the contents. The interrogation officer didn't allow 
me to read it before I signed it". He signed whatever the police 
wanted as they were subjecting him to violence. 
Tahir bin Sarwi was sentenced to 27 months. 
(It is assumed that this defendant is the person identified in 
press reports as "Sar bin W".) He told the court he hadn't 
intended to join the crowd. He is from Tegal and had just arrived 
in Jakarta the same day. He didn't know the area and found 
himself being carried along with the crowd. However peripheral 
his involvement in the demonstration, he got one of the heaviest 
sentences. 
He retracted the pre-trial interrogation report. 
Dudung bin Supian, 21 years, a water-vendor, was sentenced to 
20 months. 
Dudung had heard from a mobile loudspeaker that there was 
going to be a religious meeting at Sindang Road, so he went 
along to hear. One speaker had said the "Pancasila-as-the-sole-
principle" policy of the government was causing disquiet among 
Muslims. When the crowd dispersed, he went to the home of a 
friend nearby, but the crowd went by, shouting "Allahuakbar", 
so he joined it to find out what was going on. Then he heard 
continuous firing, and was shot in the thigh and the arm. People 
helped him get away, and got him into a hospital where he was 
under treatment for two months. On discharge, he was detained. 
When the judge asked him, "What were you carrying at the time 
of the meeting?" (meaning, apparently, in the way of a weapon) 
he replied: "Only Rp. 5,000 and that disappeared". 
Amir bin Bunari, 20 years, was sentenced to 20 months. 
He told the court he wanted to retract the pre-trial 
interrogation report which he had signed. The truth was that he 
had gone to the meeting but did not hear very clearly what was 
said because the loudspeaker kept breaking down. But he did 
hear one speaker call on the crowd to go and free the four 
detainees. He went with the section of the crowd that went in the 
direction of the military command but just as he got to the 
junction with Jos Sudarso Road, he heard continuous firing , then 
saw everyone fall to the ground. He tried to ~n away but he was 
Cassettes of speeches made at the Sindang Road meeting. 
Possessing one is an act of subversion. 
hit and lost two fingers . Others helped him get to the BPP 
· · Hospital in North Jakarta but he was later transferred to the 
Military Hospital and it was there that he was detained . 
Armin bin Mawi, 20 years, was sentenced to 21 months. 
(Probably the defendant identified as "AM".) He said he had 
listened to the lectures at Sindang Road from quite a distance, 
then joined the demonstration · because he was curious to know 
what would happen to the four detainees. He was right at the 
back of the crowd so he didn't see anything when the firing 
began. He didn't know who was firing nor from which direction 
it came. He then realised that he had been hit in the stomach by 
a bullet and fainted. 
Wasdjan bin Sukarma, 32 years, a forklift operator, was 
sentenced to 18 months. 
(His age was given in one press report as 39.) He had just 
come home from work at the docks when he saw tha~ a lecture 
was going on in Sindang Road. The vehicle he was travelling in 
could not proceed because the road was packed with people. He 
stood listening for about ten minutes, then proceeded on his way 
in the direction of Jos Sudarso Road by foot. There he waited for 
public transport. He saw about 1,500 people pass by, shouting 
"Allahuakbar" , and when they had passed, he heard continuous 
shooting. Suddenly he realised that his head was bleeding and he 
fell into the gutter. He remembers two people helping him out of 
the gutter, and taking him by taxi to hospital . Only when he 
arrived at the hospital did he realise he had been hit by a bullet. 
After being there for four days, he was taken away by district 
military command soldiers for interrogation, then transferred to 
Cimanggis detention centre . (Apparently, troops searched 
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Jakarta hospitals after the massacre, looking for young men with 
bullet wounds.) 
Nasrum bin Sulaimanah, 18 years, was sentenced to 18 months. 
He told the court that he had not gone to the lecture at 
Sindang Road. His home is nearby, and he was playing pingpong 
when the meeting was taking place . Afterwards, he lay down in a 
nearby prayer-house and fell asleep. He was woken by a crowd 
passing by, shouting "Allahuakbar" . He went out to take a look 
but when he heard firing , he ran home. Only after reaching 
home did he realise that he had been hit in the buttocks and the 
bullet had lodged in his stomach. He was rushed to hospital by is 
father , and was arrested three months later. 
Suhennan bin Surnata, was sentenced to 18 months. 
He told the court he attended the lecture meeting on Sindang 
Road then went with the crowd to the military command hoping 
to see the four people in detention. He was shot twice in the 
hand as he dropped to the ground. Other people in the crowd 
rushed him to Koja Hospital but later he was removed by 
soldiers and transferred to the Gatot Subroto Military Hospital. 
When asked by the judge to confirm the contents of his 
interrogation report, he said he didn't know what was in it 
because when he signed it, he was not given a chance to read it. 
Damsirwan bin Nordin, 21 years, was sentenced to 15 months. 
He did not attend the lecture meeting at Sindang Road as he 
was in Rawamangun. He returned home at about llpm and saw 
a large crowd at the end of the alley leading to his home. But his 
kakak (older brother or sister) asked him to go out and look for 
their two adik (younger brothers or sisters) who hadn't come 
home yet. First he went to the Lido Theatre and there he saw the 
crowd (from the meeting) mingle with the people coming out of 
the theatre. As he hadn't found his two adik, he continued on his 
way to the Permai Theatre. Then he heard a lot of gunfire but 
took no notice and continued his search. When someone running 
beside him collapsed after having been shot, he too fell and lay 
stiff pretending to be dead, but a police officer came and kicked 
him in the head. The officer lifted him on to a truck and he was 
taken to Gatot Subroto Military Hospital. He found his 2 adik 
there; they had both been shot. Then he was detained. (The 
Kompas report does not explain how seriously the 2 adik were 
hurt, or whether they were killed. Suara Karya reported that 
one was shot in the leg which was later amputated. SK also 
reports that Damsirwan was hit by two bullets.) 
lrta Sumirta, 17 years, was sentenced to 15 months. 
He retracted the confessions reported in his pre-trial 
interrogation report. He told the court he attended the lecture 
meeting on Sindang Road, but didn't hear the speeches very 
clearly because the loudspeaker kept breaking down. He heard 
one of the speakers, whom he identified as Amir Biki, call on the 
crowd to press for the four detainees to be released. He went 
along with the crowd, and when the shooting started, he tried to 
get out of the way of the bullets, but he was hit in the thigh. 
People rushed him to the Jakarta Islamic Hospital, but later he 
was shifted from there to Gatot Subroto Army Hospital. 
Mardi bin Wage, 25 years, was sentenced to 15 months. 
This defendant told the court he didn't really know what was 
happening. At 10.30 that evening, he was in Sindang Road to 
listen to lectures by three speakers, Salim Kadar, M. Nasir and 
Yayan Handayana. (All three are now under arrest.) One of the 
things the speakers did was to ask the people in the crowd to go 
to the police and military headquarters to release four detainees. 
The defendant joined the part of the crowd that went to the 
police. He was about to go home when security forces closed the 
road and began firing. He managed to hide in a drainage ditch 
but was picked up by a police officer and arrested. 
The defendant also retracted his pre-trial interrogation 
report. "I don't know what is in that report. The officer didn't let 
me read it before telling me to sign it", he told the court. 
(Because of the difficulty of identifying the defendants b~ 
their initials, it may be that some of the information for Mardi 
bin Wage and Martowo has been wrongly attributed.) 
Budi Santoso, 18 years, was sentenced to 15 months. 
This defendant too made a point of formally retracting the 
confessions contained in his pre-trial interrogation report. He 
told the court he attended the lecture meeting in Sindang Road 
but had difficulty hearing the speakers because the loudspeaker 
kept breaking down . When later the firing began , he dropped to 
the ground when he saw others doing the same thing. When the 
shooting stopped, he got up to run away but realised that a bullet 
had hit him in the back and come out through the left side of his 
chest. Some people helped him to get to Koja Hospital , but after 
he had been given treatment there, he was removed to the Gatot 
Subroto Army Hospital. 
Afriul bin Masur, 18 years, was sentenced to 15 months. 
He told the court he had gone along to the meeting at Sindang 
Road but hadn't heard the speeches all too well because of the 
poor amplification. He did hear the call made to the crowd from 
the platform to go and demand the release of the four detainees. 
He too retracted everything contained in his interrogation report 
which he had not been allowed to read before signing. 
Sudarso bin Rais, 19 years, was sentenced to 14 months. 
He too said he was at the lecture meeting but could not hear 
the speakers clearly, though he did hear one of them call for the 
release of the four detainees. After the meeting ended, he joined 
the rest of the crowd. When later the firing started, he was shot 
in the hand, and still has a bullet (lodged) . He also told the court 
he helped lift two other defendants on to a fire-engine to be 
transported to hospital. The two were Magsudi bin lrsad who 
was seriously wounded and still has a bullet lodged in his body, 
and Ismail bin Abdul Hamid, who was shot in the waist. Both of 
these wounded men are among the defendants. 
Umar bin Sundu, 18 years, was sentenced to 15 months. 
This defendant also retracted his pre-trial deposition. He had 
not been at the meeting, nor had he joined the demonstration, 
he was on his way home, going in the same direction as the 
demonstration. This is why it looked as if he was walking with 
the crowd at the time. He stopped at Permai Road to wait for 
public transport. Suddenly he heard firing, and seeing someone 
nearby shot, he ran to a nearby mosque to fetch a wooden 
stretcher, a keranda (used for burials). With others, he then 
began to carry the body to a safe place, but a security officer 
intercepted them and told them to put the victim down. Umar 
then went to the Semper mosque to get some sleep till things 
were safe, but a security officer told him to go home. On the way 
home he was arrested. 
Ferdinan M. Silalahi, probably sentenced to 12 months 
The only list of sentences available at the time of going to 
press is the one published by Sinar Harapan (12 April) which is 
unfortunately one name short. The missing name is Ferdinan 
Silalahi. We assume he received a 12 months sentence as the 
prosecution's demand for sentence, 18 months, was the same as 
that demanded for other defendants who were sentenced to 12 
months. 
Ferdinan was the only Christian in the group of 28. He told 
the court he had converted to Islam since his arrest. He attended 
the Sindang Road meeting at the suggestion of friends, because 
he was already interested in Islamic teachings. He had got his 
parents' permission to attend. When the speakers had finished 
speaking, he joined the crowd of demonstrators, but fted when 
he heard the sound of firing. He was arrested as he was getting 
on to a public transport vehicle (omprengan) to go home. He was 
held in Cimanggis detention centre where he met Syarifuddin 
Rambe, one of the four Tanjung Priok detainees and it was 
under his influence that he finally converted to Islam. 
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Yusron bin Zainuri, 25 years, was sentenced to 12 months. 
This defendant is sometimes identified as "Yus" , sometimes 
as "Mus". Reports of his evidence are available not only from 
the Indonesian press but also from AFP which filed a story on 2 
March that Yusron told the court that the troops opened fire on 
the demonstrators after they had obeyed the order to halt . This 
clearly refutes Murdani's claim that demonstrators "mobbed" 
the troops even after being told to stop . Yusron said4n court that 
as soon as the shooting finished , army trucks arrived on the scene 
to carry the casualties off to the Gatot Subroto Army Hospital in 
central Jakarta . He was himself thrown onto one of these trucks 
which was already filled with about 50 people. 
During the demonstration , he was in the front ranks of the 
marchers and was able to see everything very clearly. He was hit 
several times . One bullet pierced him right through, another is 
still lodged in his body. Yet another hit him in the arm , and is 
also still lodged inside . He opened his shirt to show the court his 
wounds. A few days after testifying, Yusron collapsed during a 
trial hearing on 12 March (see Sinar Harapan of the same day) . 
He was carried out of the courtroom by two soldiers and rushed 
to hospital for emergency treatment. 
Yusron also told the court that for two months after the 
incident, he was in hospital, but his parents were never informed 
of his whereabouts. After consulting a dukun (spiritual healer) , 
they assumed that he was dead and carried out a ceremony for 
the dead. It was only after he was discharged from hospital and 
allowed to return home that they realised that he was still alive . 
Misdi bin Saimin, 16 years, was sentenced to 12 months. 
His name appears in a group of six defendants whose 
· testimony was heard on 7 March. No details about his testimony 
are provided in the Kompas report except that he retracted his 
pre-trial deposition and told the court that he attended the 
Sindang Road meeting. 
Amir Mahmud bin Dulkasan, 20 years, was sentenced to 12 
months. 
Very little has been reported about his testimony in court , 
unless the information has been mixed up with testimony from 
someone else, over a confusion in initials . 
Ismail bin Abdul Hamid, 20 years, was sentenced to 12 months. 
He, like most of the defendants would not confirm the pre-
trial interrogation deposition because he was not able to read it 
when he was told to sign it . 
He was among the crowd of demonstrators who went to Jos 
Sudarso Road to call for the releas.e of the four detainees . He 
was shot and wounded when the firing started. When he was 
being lifted up onto a truck for transportation to hospital , he was 
beaten up by the troops , and two of his ribs were broken . He was 
hospitalised for four months because of the severity of his 
injuries . 
Syafrizal bin Sofyan, 18 years, was sentenced to 12 months. 
Nothing is reported about Syafrizal's testimony in court 
except that he too retracted the information contained in the 
pre-trial deposition which he had signed without being allowed 
to read. 
Magsudi bin lrsad, 22 years, was sentenced to 12 months. 
(This defendant is sometimes identified as "Mach".) Of all 
the defendants still suffering from the wounds inflicted five 
months earlier in Tanjung Priok , Magsudi was clearly the most 
seriously ill. At the hearing (reported in Kompas on 1 March) , 
two of the defence lawyers made a special plea on his behalf. 
They told the court that although a bullet was still lodged in his 
chest , no operation had been performed , only superficial 
treatment administered'. His physical condition was rapidly 
deteriorating. The lawyer asked the court to designate a hospital 
to perform an urgently-needed operation to remove the bullet. 
Without a court order, no hospital would take him in for 
treatment as all hospitals had been ordered not to treat the 
defendants. The prosecutor rejected this and said that according 
to a special decision , these detainees may only be treated at the 
Police Hospital in Kramat Jati . It was not possible therefore for 
the defendants to be transferred . During most of the trial , 
Magsudi was not able to sit inside the courtroom but lay on a 
long wooden chair (a bench?) outside the courtroom . He was 
described as being very thin , justskin and bone , according to one 
report. 
The first time Magsudi appeared inside the courtroom was on 
14 March to testify . He was by now "even thinner" . As he was 
escorted into the courtroom, the rancid smell of wounds which 
were still discharging pus , could be felt throughout the room . He 
was placed on a chair with his legs supported on another chair . 
The defendant who makes his living selling bananas told the 
Graffiti in Tanjung Priok: 'Hidup Islam' (long live Islam). (Tempo, 27.10.84) 
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court he did not attend the meeting at Sindang Road, but he 
overheard the speeches from the place where he was selling fruit, 
about three hundred metres away. After selling all his wares, he 
left for home but the crowd began to move. He went along 
because he was curious to see what was going on. When he 
reached the traffic lights at Jos Sudarso Road, he saw the 
demonstration stop in front of the troops. The crowd was only 
shouting "Allahauakbar" and waving their arms, so, thinking 
this was not very interesting, he started to go home. He had 
walked only four metres when he heard gunshots. He was hit in 
the buttocks and stomach as he was about to drop to the ground, 
and lost consciousness. 
When cross-examined by the judge, Magsudi frequently 
replied that he couldn't remember anything more. Neither the 
prosecutor nor the defence lawyers asked him any questions 
when given the opportunity by the court. 
For some idea of the degree of distortions about the trial in 
the press, Tempo (2 February) reports that Magsudi was 
wounded "by warning shots" from the security forces. 
Cecep Basuki bin Wagi, 16 years, was sentenced to 12 months. 
He is one of the youngest of all the defendants. He told the 
court he was not present at the Sindang Road meeting. He had 
gone out that evening to see a film at the Permai Theatre but 
because the film he wanted to see was no longer playing he went 
to a food stall to have a plate of noodle soup instead. As he 
finished eating, the demonstration passed by, so he got up and 
joined them. When the shooting started, he dropped to the 
ground until it stopped. Then an officer beat him with his rifle 
butt. After ten days' treatment in hospital, he was arrested. 
Suara Karya has him saying that he cried because he was afraid 
of the noise of the guns. He was taken to Guntur (military 
police) prison and interrogated. He said "yes" to everything in 
the hope that they would stop barking at him. 
Asep Syafruddin bin M Subandri, 21 years, was sentenced to 12 
months. 
He was out shopping at Permai Market which stays open till 
late at night. He did not attend the Sindang Road meeting. After 
buying a typewriter ribbon for his parents, he saw demonstrators 
walking along, shouting "Allahuakbar". He was going in the 
same direction as the demonstrators but was about 300 metres 
behind. When he heard the firing start, he ran to take shelter in 
the small alleyways nearby. As he was running, he noticed a 
lorry with security troops coming up behind him. Then a bullet 
hit him in the head, and he fell unconscious. 
Iuscone bin Dyas, 20 years, was sentenced to 12 months. 
This defendant makes it clear that the crowd stopped when 
ordered to do so by the troops, contradicting General Murdani's 
claim that the troops starting shooting "in self-defence" .. 
The defendant said he heard Amir Biki's speech and said the 
speaker asked the crowd to divide into two groups. At first, he 
was not intending to join in but did so out of curiosity and fou.nd 
himself at the head of the group moving towards the police 
headquarters. When they reached Jos Sudarso Road, he saw 
armed troops blocking the road. An officer warned the crowd to 
stop and they did . Without any reason, the officer then fired. 
The defendant was the first to be struck down. Two bullets 
lodged in his chest; he showed the court the two small holes. 
"One bullet has been removed, the other is still inside", he said. 
Asked by a defence lawyer whether he had seen the crowd 
carrying weapons like crowbars or rocks which the prosecution 
had submitted as exhibits, the defendant said, "No". (Suara 
Karya's much shorter account of this defendant's testimony has 
him saying that the crowd continued to advance after being told 
to stop.) This defendant's testimony also refutes the Army's 
claim that the troops first fired warning shots into the air before 
firing straight at the crowd. 
Wahyudi bin Saleh, 22 years, was sentenced to 12 months. 
This defendant can only walk with the aid of a pair of 
crutches. He said he attended the Sindang Road meeting and 
joined the demonstrators who made their way to the Army 
headquarters. He was immediately behind someone carrying a 
green banner. He too testified that the crowd had stopped 
advancing when ordered to halt by the troops; he said that when 
they were obstructed by armed security officers, they halted, 
some standing, some sitting down in front of the soldiers. Then, 
without any apparent reason, the soldiers started firing. The 
crowd dispersed, running off or dropping to the ground. He 
himself was shot in the foot as he tried to get up and run. After 
the shooting stopped, officers approached the victims sprawled 
on the ground. When he asked an officer for help, he was kicked 
and beaten. After being hospitalised for two months at the Gatot 
Subroto Army hospital, he was discharged and sent home. He 
was arrested in December without an arrest warrant or any 
report to his neighbourhood chief or his parents. 
The end of the trial 
The Prosecutor's Summing-up 
In his summing-up of the proceedings, the prosecutor, Soerjadi, 
WS, showed that he treated evidence produced by the 
defendants with contempt. He claimed that it had been 
convincingly proven that the defendants waged resistance with 
violence. Evidence presented by the witnesses, almost all of 
whom were members of the security forces, (as far as we know, 
the only non-ABRI witnesses were the two who appeared on 
behalf of Hendra bin Sjafri) has proven, he said, that the security 
forces faced thousands of people who were "bristling" (beringas) 
with resistance, as a result of which several members of the 
security forces were wounded. He claimed that there was no 
evidence that force had been used during the interrogation of the 
defendants and that therefore the interrogation reports were 
perfectly valid documents of evidence. By retracting their 
interrogation reports, the prosecution argued, the defendants 
had only reinforced the proof of their guilt. He dismissed the 
evidence presented by witnesses on behalf of Hendra Sjafri as 
worthless. 
Evidence from the prosecution witnesses had proven 
convincingly that the defendants had been weilding offensive 
weapons, notwithstanding the fact that none of the defendants 
admitted this. Moreover, since the defendants had confessed to 
having attended the Sindang Road meeting, there was no 
question of their guilt. 
Kompas (23 March) reported that as the prosecutor 
mentioned each defendant by name to demand sentence, people 
in the public gallery started weeping. Soon the weeping and 
wailing was so loud that the prosecutor could only make himself 
heard by shouting above all the noise. He demanded sentences 
ranging from 18 months to five years. 
Before the defence lawyers delivered their defence 
statements many of the defendants delivered their own defence 
pleas. This too proved to be a very emotional occasion as many 
of them were unable to conceal their feelings and wept as they 
described their sufferings on the night of 12 September and 
subsequently from the injuries inflicted, and the brutalities to 
which they were subjected during detention. 
The Defence Plea 
The defence lawyers insisted that none of the charges made 
against the defendants by the prosecution had been proven in 
court. The only thing that was clear was that most of them had 
attended a meeting at Sindang Road on 12 September 1984 and 
had then gone on a demonstration. None of the prosecution 
witnesses heard in court was able to testify that they had seen 
any of the defendants conducting acts of violence against the 
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troops or carrying any of the "weapons" presented in court as 
exhibits. On the contrary, 24 out of the 28 defendants were 
injured when troops opened fire. "Where is the logic", asked 
defence lawyer H .C. Princen, "if the people who fired the shots 
are .not punished while those who were shot are?" 
He later told an Australian journalist: "The sentences called 
for by the Government are very heavy if one considers my clients 
are victims and the prosecution can't prove anything." He 
laughed when he was asked whether he thought he could win the 
case : "It is almost impossible to get a fair hearing in the case of a 
political trial." (Weekend Australian, 6-7 April, 1985 .) 
The Court Verdict 
This almost point-for-point follows the arguments presented by 
The Bombings Trial 
the prosecution in their summing-up. While the court did not 
press the subversion charge, it found all the defendants guilty of 
having tried to "storm" a police station and an army command 
post. The court was satisfied , on the basis of the testimony of 
police interrogators, that the defendants had signed their 
interrogation statements free from pressure or duress, and 
therefore accepted these statements as valid evidence regardless 
of the many retractions in court . 
The court accepted as "extenuating circumstances", weighing 
in the defendants' favour , the fact that some of them had had to 
undergo major surgery for the removal of bullets and that most 
of them were still young. But one "aggravating" circumstance 
was that they "often attended talks and sermons with 'extremist' 
tendencies" . 
A political frame-up 
Nine people have been on trial for subversion in connection with a series of bombing incidents in Jakarta on 4 October 1984. Sentences 
passed so far are: 
H. Muhammad Sanusi, 64 years, member of Petition-of-50 group, businessman and former minister (1966--68) for textile industries, was 
given a sentence of 19 years, the heaviest sentence of all, on trumped-up charges of funding the bombing campaign. 
Melta Halim, a salesman, 32 years, who admitted to having planted one of the bombs, was given a sentence of 14 years. 
Chaerul Syah, a 21-year-old student, who admitted to having helped the bombing campaign by setting the timers, was given a sentence of 
10 years. 
Rachmat Basoeki Soeropranoto, who confessed to having helped organise and plan the bombings, was given a sentence of 17 years. 
Eddy Ramli, another of the men who confessed to planting one of the bombs, was given a sentence of 16 years. 
Hasnul Arilin, involved in the bombings as the person who stored explosives, and who was also intending to produce a leaflet about the 
Tanjung Priok massacre, was given a sentence of 15 years. 
The three others on trial are: Muhammad Tasrif Tuasikal, Jayadi and Amir Wijaya. 
On 4 October last year, two Jakarta branches of Bank Central 
Asia were the targets of a bombing campaign. A third target, a 
Chinese-owned shop, was selected at the last minute instead of 
the BCA head office which turned out to be too heavily guarded. 
The Bank Central Asia is part of the huge finance and business 
empire of Liem Sioe Liong, a close business associate of 
President Suharto. Two people were killed by the blast at the 
shop, while a number were injured by the other blasts, including 
Jayadi, one of the men who planted the bombs. 
The bombing campaign was unleashed shortly after the 
Tanjung Priok massacre in a wave of disturbances that reflected 
the disquiet and unrest among many Indonesian Muslims, not 
only because so many people had been killed but also because 
the statement issued by General Murdani on 13 September was a 
crude distortion of the facts . (See item on the trial of the 28, 
pages 3--8.) But the unrest more generally reflects resentment 
and dissatisfaction among many Muslims at the regime's 
determination to force all political and social organisations to 
accept the State ideology, Pancasila, as their sole ideology (azas 
tunggal) including organisations based on religious beliefs. 
The three main figures being charged, Rachmat Basuki, 
Tasrif Tuasikal and Abdul Qadir Djaelani whose trial is 
scheduled to commence in June, on charges of "extremist 
lecturing", have been involved in previous actions to oppose 
adoption of the Pancasila, and were all sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment for involvement in an incident in March 1978 
when the upper chamber (MPR) was discussing matters relating 
to State ideological indoctrination. 
Seven of the nine trials started sif!1ultaneously in January, 
with the odd spectacle of defendants also being called to testify 
as witnesses in each other's trials. The two men whose trials were 
deferred till later, commencing only after most of the evidence 
had been heard in the other trials, were Moh. Tasrif Tuasikal 
and Amir Wijaya. The reasons will become clear below, as both 
men appear to have been playing disruptive roles within the 
group. 
The Plot against Sanusi and the Petition-of-SO group 
Of all the nine "BCA bombing" defendants, the only one who 
denied any involvement in the bombings is Moh. Sanusi who was 
accused of having supplied half a million rupiahs to fund the 
blasts, of supplying detonators and of helping to plan the 
bombing campaign. 
Sanusi has been a leading member of the Muslim social 
organisation, Muhammadiyah for many years. He was a member 
of the DPR (Indonesia's parliament) from 1971-77 for the 
Muslim Party, Parmusi and later for the merged United 
Development Party (PPP). In 1980, he joined forces with critics 
of the regime to issue the "Petition of 50". He is one of the least 
charismatic members of the group and has no former military 
backing, by contrast with men like Marine Corps officer, 
Lieutenant-General Ali Sadikin, Police General Hugeng Imam 
Santoso. Nor does he enjoy the stature of dissident politicians 
like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. He also has business connections 
with one of the ackowledged organisers of the bombing 
campaign, Rachmat Basuki. His vulnerability led the authorities 
to single him out as the victim of a plot to establish a link 
between the bombing campaign and the Petition-of-SO group, in 
order to discredit the group. 
The prosecution used Sanusi's connections with Basuki to pin 
the label of "bombing financier" on him, alleging that he gave 
half a million rupiahs to Basuki for the campaign. According to 
Sanusi, this was part of a broker commission he owed Basuki for 
a land deal. He told the court the only cash he gave Basuki for 
non-business reasons was Rp 60,000 and another £45,000 to 
investigate the facts about the Tanjung Priok massacre and print 
a leaflet presenting the facts. This leaflet was to have been 
produced by Hasnul Arifin to whom the money was passed, but 
the leaflet never appeared because Hasnul said that he could not 
find a printer prepared to take the risk involved. 
The case against Sanusi had relied heavily on the testimony of 
the other defendants, claiming he provided half a million rupiahs 
for the bombs. (Sanusi never denied supplying money for an 
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investigation of the Tanjung Priok affair.) But at hearings on 9 
March, Rachmat Basuki and Melta Halim both withdrew 
statements made during pre-trial interrogations about Sanusi . (It 
was later reported that Rachmat Basuki wrote a letter to Sanusi 
apologising for having got him into such deep trouble.) 
Basuki said the interrogators from the kejaksaan (public 
prosecutor's office) were "directing" the interrogations in order 
to incriminate Sanusi. "I was afraid I would end up like Hasnul 
Arifin . He was in a ghastly state. I didn't dare say anything 
different. I was psychologically under duress (tidak bebas)". In 
his own trial, Melta Halim declared that until the time of his 
arrest , he knew nothing at all about Sanusi. In prison , he heard 
so many conflicting stories from Rachmat Basuki about Sanusi 
that he didn't know where the truth lay . (Kompas, 10 March.) 
Three days later, Tasrif Tuasikal and Hasnul Arifin also 
withdrew an earlier testimony incriminating Sanusi. Tuasikal's 
revised testimony suggests that even before the bombings, he 
had been trying to implicate Sanusi in the plot. He first testified 
that the detonators used were supplied by Sanusi but now said 
that when he asked Sanusi to provide detonators , "Sanusi 
greeted this coldly" . It turns out in fact that Tuasikal didn't even 
need detonators at the time as everything required for the bomb 
attacks was already at hand . "I only asked him for detonators 
because I wanted to inveigle him into giving money. (Tuasikal's 
words suggest a deliberate attempt to trap Sanusi . If this is so , 
there is good reason to believe that army intelligence had 
infiltrated the BCA bombing group.) 
As for Hasnul Arifin, the extreme pressures exerted on him 
became clear during intense cross-examination by defence 
lawyer Yap Thiam Hien when Arifin appeared as a witness in the 
trial of Rachmat Basuki . At first, when he withdrew testimony 
incriminating Sanusi , he claimed no force was used during 
interrogation. But when pressed by Yap, he told the court that 
before being interrogated by the police, he was interrogated by 
others whom he could not identify, nor did he know which 
authority they worked for. As Yap persisted with his 
questioning, the prosecution intervened, complaining that this 
line of questioning was "irrelevant" . For once, the judges upheld 
the defence counsel's line of questioning. Then Hasnul 
proceeded to tell the court that he was arrested on 7 Otober by 
people not in uniform and without an arrest warrant. He spent 
the first two days at Kodim (the district military command), then 
was taken, blindfolded to a secret destination and interrogated 
by unknown people. Still blindfolded, they started to beat him. 
"It felt like rattan" , he said. After being beaten up, he was told 
to make a statement and sign it fast. Later, he admitted that 
when under police interrogation, he could not get the image of 
these earlier interrogators out of his mind so proceeded to make 
up many things in his statement to the police . 
With their case against Sanusi now in shreds, the prosecution 
then introduced a new witness four days later in the next hearing 
of Sanusi's trial. This was a man named Amir Wijaya who 
proceeded to incriminate Sanusi with a new set of allegations, 
claiming now that Sanusi gave him Rp 100,000 to buy 
detonators . He even alleged that Sanusi took part in the 
decisions about the choice of targets. This witness was fiercely 
Sanusi and his wife after the verdict. (Jakarta Post, 17.5.85) 
cross-examined by Yap. He was unable to say when he was 
arrested though recollected that it was by the army in Garut , 
West Java. In breach of procedure, no report of his pre-trial 
interrogation was submitted to court and the court refused to 
comply with a request from Yap for documents proving that 
Amir was detained at Salemba Prison as he claimed in court. The 
witness refused to answer many of Yap's questions and even 
used threatening language against the lawyer. As for Sanusi, he 
totally rejected Amir's testimony as complete fabrication . 
At a subsequent hearing, Sanusi demolished the testimony of 
Amir. His own enquiries at Salemba Prison revealed that Amir 
had never been detained there . Amir's claim to have met Sanusi 
on 8 October was false because he was on his way home from 
Japan on that day. 
He devoted some time to explaining to the court why he 
signed the White Paper on the Tanjung Priok incident. He 
rejected allegations that the White Paper was "illegal" or 
"secretive" (gelap) . It was properly signed and intended for 
submission to the government as a contribution to seeking the 
true facts. He vigorously denied any connection between the 
White Paper and the BCA bomb blasts. 
Unfortunately for Sanusi, however, the prosecution pursued 
its case against him undeterred by the damage inflicted on their 
case during Yap's persistent cross-examination. In his summing-
up, the prosecutor demanded the death sentence, and on 15 
May, the court passed a 19-year sentence against Sanusi. For a 
man his age, this amounts to a life sentence. 
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Lawyers under pressure 
Yap Thiam Hien sentenced to three months 
While Yap Thiam Hein was fighting hard to protect the rights 
of his "BCA bombings" clients, he was himself being tried on 
charges connected with a case he defended in the late 1970s. The 
charges involved an announcement he placed in the press in 1979 
on behalf of his client , asking her nephew to account for money 
he had run off with. The nephew was later cleared of this charge , 
but Yap argued in court that solicitors could not be charged with 
defamation of character for actions they took on behalf of 
clients. The ne;>hew died several years ago, and moreover, the 
charge levelled against Yap should never have proceeded 
because, according to the statute of limitations , it was already 
out of date . 
During the Yap trial , both Yap himself and his defence 
counsel , Haryono Titrosubono engaged in fierce exchanges with 
the chairman of the court. In the event, the court found Yap 
guilty of a secondary charge of "causing unpleasantness" while 
the first charge was dropped because of the statute of limitations. 
In passing sentence however, the chairman of the court made a 
number of very offensive remarks about Yap. He refused to 
accept Yap's age (he is 72) as an "extenuating" circumstance. 
Instead, he accused Yap of being "as stubborn as an old donkey. 
The older he gets, the more set he becomes in his ways" . 
Moreover, he said, Yap was "arrogant , egotistical and wanting 
only to win (mau menang sendiri)" . 
A few days after sentence was passed, several members of the 
DPR publicly denounced the judge for his very emotional attack 
on Yap. 
Yap Thiam Hien 
The trial was clearly timed to discredit Yap while he was 
defending the "BCA" cases . Originally , he should have been 
tried together with his client , but even though she failed to turn 
up and was now abroad indefinitely, the court decided to 
proceed with the case against him alone and excluded her from 
the charge sheet. 
Sources: Sinar Harapan , 2 April, 30 April and 3 May; Jakarta 
Post, 1 May 1985 . 
Lawcourts will supervise lawyers 
The chairman of the Supreme Court, Lieutenant-General Ali 
Said has announced that a new regulation is soon to be intro-
duced granting powers to the chairmen of high courts throughout 
the country to exercise supervision over lawyers. Under the new 
regulation, lawyers will be required to register with . their reg-
ional high court chairman and will be able to practise only if they 
receive a licence to do so from this official. 
The announcement came in response to a request for clarifi-
cation from lawyers in East Java after the chairman of the 
Surabaya High Court introduced a regulation requiring lawyers 
to register and stipulating that they would need licences to prac-
tise which would have to be renewed every two years. Until now, 
lawyers have needed only a licence from the Ministry of Justice 
when they start practising and there has never been any question 
of renewal throughout their career. 
The Surabaya decision followed soon after Pamudji , a well-
known lawyer there , Was suspended from practising by the 
Surabaya District Court. Not Jong afterwards, Pamudji died of a 
heart attack. (See TAPOL Bulletin No 68, January 1985.) 
Surabaya lawyers had hoped Ali Said would refuse to uphold the 
new registration system. "They are forcing us to our knees" , said 
one East Java lawyer, Trimoelyo Soerjadi . In the words of 
Tempo (20 April) , "it looks as though the era of free movement 
for lawyers is coming to an end" . 
Just out 
Indonesian Workers 
and their Right 
to Organise 
March 1985 Update 
Leiden. March 1985 
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The entire workforce at the United Can Company went on a one-day strike in May. 
Here, Labour Minister Admiral Sudomo tells the workers that 'Pancasila labour relations' 
forbids strikes (Jakarta Post, 8.5.85) 
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The Church which is moved by the deep conviction that it "not 
only has the right, but also the duty to express an authorised 
view" {Pope Pius XII , radio-message of June 1, 1941) on events 
that affect the social lives of people, feels the need to throw light, 
through its doctrine, upon the present situation of the people of 
East Timor. The Church in Timor shares with the People "the 
sorrow that oppresses it , the pain that torments it and the 
anguish it feels" (S.B.Antoine Pierre Khoraichei, Patriarch of 
Antioquia, Pastoral Letter, ·Lent 1976, G .S. No.1)* 
The Church knows that the Timorese families have lost dearly 
beloved relatives, freedom, wealth and property; the Church is 
aware of the fact that minds have hardened with the terror of 
war, privation and exodus of the people of East Timor. 
The Church in Timor, moved by the conscience of duty itself 
and sensitive to the appeals of many and to the voice of a great 
majority, believes that the moment has come to put forward the 
principles and standards which will enable its attitude towards 
the problem of the people of East Timor to be understood, 
whilst making no claim to call upon itself the means of solving 
these same problems. 
In the case of East Timor, where it enjoys a close relationship 
with the People, the Church, in the exercise of its mission, has 
not remained nor can remain indifferent or divorced from the 
historical vicissitudes of this same People. 
Conscious of this mission, the Church wishes to set down 
what it feels to be vital and urgent for the defense and 
safeguarding of the fundamental values and human rights of the 
people of East Timor, as well as their identity, at this historical 
moment in time. 
Facts 
The 25th of April of 1974 brought the people of East Timor the 
opportunity to exercise their inalienable rights of freedom and 
the ability to choose their own future. 
Basing themselves on this right, recognised by the Portuguese 
government and promoted by the United Nations, three major 
political parties were formed, each with its own political ideas 
about how this right should be exercised. Notwithstanding the 
efforts of all concerned to find a solution that would safeguard 
the identity of the people of East Tim or, the divergences arose to 
such an extent as to lead to an armed conflict. The present armed 
conflict, however, which we are encouraged to see as a fratricidal 
war, is in fact a struggle between the superior strength of the 
regular Indonesian army and those forces originally involved in 
the safeguarding of the identity of the Timorese people. 
Doctrinal Principles 
Having experienced with the People all the events, which, since 
1975, have deeply affected the social and political life of this 
same People, the Church bears anxious witness to facts that are 
slowly leading to the ethnic, cultural and religious extinction of 
the identity of the People of East Timor. 
The Church wholeheartedly proclaims and desires Peace, 
friendship and well-being for all peoples. The Church affirms 
with the strength that comes from its own mission that "the 
people are sovereign over their own destiny" (RH, No.17, cfr. 
PP No.65)* 
The Church understands this principle to mean that the 
people have rights, which are necessary to safeguard in any and 
every circumstance. 
In our times, in which social awareness has grown 
enormously, no people freely accepts being governed by 
another. Only a real respect for such rights endows legitimacy to 
any regime. Furthermore the right of authority can only be 
understood in the context of objective and inviolable human 
rights. 
The Church is also convinced that the violation of human 
rights is linked to the violation of the rights of a nation, with 
which Man is intimately tied, as it were, to a greater family. 
We recognise that the Indonesian government has 
undertaken development in several sectors of the social life in 
East Timor, such as in schooling, agriculture, the media, 
transport and health. On the other hand, since 1975 and to the 
Statement by ~ 
Catholic Church 
present, the people of East Timor have suffered the horrors ~f 
war, a war they did not want. There is no harmony among its 
children; the well-being and happiness desired by all are ~ar from 
being reality for the majority of the people. The T1morese 
people are exhausted, their dearest hopes are frustrated and they 
have been deluded by so many promises. That is why we must 
have the courage to go to the roots of all these ills. All parties 
involved in this conflict must assume their own responsibilities. 
We cannot divide them into good and evil. 
Keeping a clear head, free from political bias and 
preconceived ideas, let us examine the facts. We cannot build 
the future on a present undermined by past mistakes. We must 
have the courage to analyse these errors of the past to enable the 
goal to which all aspire to be reached after the cause of such ills 
has been removed. 
Analysis 
Throughout centuries the Church in East Timor has shared the 
lot of the People and the social and political conditions that have 
affected their lives. That is why the Church in East Timor has 
Mgr. Belo (right) with his predecessor, Mgr. Martinhu da 
Costa Lopes (centre) in Dili 
always been present and has identified with the Timorese 
people, rejoicing in the satisfaction of the people towards order, 
prosperity and freedom, and being sorrowful at th~ sadness of 
the people towards oppression, errors and misfortune. Difficult 
times for the people of East Timor have also been difficult for 
the Church. 
After nine years of occupation by the Indonesian government 
of this territory, which it considers to be an integral part of the 
Indonesian nation, the war which they would have us believe to 
be a civil war goes on and continues to grow, which is witnessed 
by the constant arrival of Indonesian troops together with heavy 
war material, the deployment of more than 10 military 
helicopters for operational purposes and of several airforce 
combat aircraft. In view of the permanent insecurity of the 
population in many regions of East Timor, the continuous 
exodus of the Timorese people, forced migrations to 
resettlement camps and the absence of freedom of circulation , 
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we think that the moment has come to put the following 
questions: 
, Is all this merely brought about by a stubborn minority or 
does it reveal something deeper about the demand for basic 
rights of the people? 
The Church believes that the people of East Timor feel that 
fundamental human rights have been violated. Among these 
rights is the right of the Timorese people to choose and direct 
their own future. This means in fact the right to govern one's life 
according to one's own identity. 
The Indonesian government p~()ceeds from the assumption 
that the people of East Timor have already exercised their right 
to self-determination. However, as the necessary conditions for 
this have not yet been created, the Church considers that here 
resides one of the causes behind the situation of anguish 
experienced by the people of East Timor over the .last nine years. 
A war that continues for nine years cannot be imputed to the 
blind obstinacy of a minority. 
If that were so, what would then be the explanation of the 
arrests, disappearances and the deportation of thousands of 
civilians during these nine years? On the other hand, if the 
majority of the Timorese people have already chosen their 
future, why then do they continue to be persecuted and 
eliminated? 
These are the questions that come to mind to anyone who has 
witnessed all the events which have taken place since August 
1975. It is therefore a necessary and urgent prerequisite for 
peace, social harmony and well7being that the Timorese people 
effectively enjoy all their basic human rights. 
Ethnic, Religious and Cultural Identity 
All human beings aspire to fulfil their own personal identity as an 
integral part of the environment in which they live. When 
internal or external factors lead to a divorce or, even more 
serious, to loss of this identity, the person as such is annihilated. 
In East Timor we are witnessing an upheaval of gigantic and 
tragic proportions in the social and cultural framework of the 
Timorese people, whose identity is threatened by destruction. 
Each community and ethnic group has its own identity. In each 
community there is a set of cultural patterns and models of 
behaviour which are acquired by each of its members and that 
determine common feelings and attitudes. This common core of 
feelings and attitudes which all the members of a same society 
share, forms what some scientists call the fundamental 
framework of their personalities. 
This is not the time to study the identity of the Timorese 
people. In the midst of this catastrophe that is aflicting the 
people of East Timor, the Church concentrates its attention on 
the individual and cannot help but proclaim the message of 
salvation and human dignity, whilst condemning injustice and 
the threat to human dignity. 
I. The ethnic identity of the Timorese people is being gravely 
violated and threatened as the following facts demonstrate: 
a) Successive, systematic and regular "cleaning-up operations" 
of the Indonesian army against centres of resistance. 
b) The permanent threat of reprisals with summary execution 
by shooting of men and youths of the villages which are 
considered to be sympathetic, refuge or support for the 
resistance forces. 
c) The enlistment of minors as auxiliary forces in military 
operations. 
d) Waves of arrests of villagers, even the most simple and 
humble peasants. 
e) The inefficiency of sanitary assistance to the population for 
numerous illnesses many of which are endemic. 
f) The concentration of the population in resettlement camps 
A group of 'model farmers', transmigrants to East Timor, 
hefore their departure. The Governor of Bali is there to see 
them off (Jakarta Post, 13.5.85) 
in inhuman conditions without recourse to self-sufficiency, 
making it dependent on irregular supplies . 
g) The recruitment of the more able members of the 
population and their preparation for military operations . 
h) The compulsory night-watch duty which is carried out under 
inhuman conditions. 
i) The systematic occupation of key-posts in the public 
administration by Indonesians, generally belonging to the 
military, which means a gradual expulsion of the Timorese. 
j) The gotong-royong ("Mutual-help Program") which is being 
carried out in ignorance of people's needs . 
2. Religious identity 
The Timorese people live their religious beliefs. They recognise 
the existence of the Maromac, supreme being, as the source of 
all temporal and spiritual wealths. They worship Julies (sacred 
relics) and have the cult of the souls of their forefathers. Sacred 
houses are built where the instruments of the cult are kept. 
After the arrival of the Catholic missionaries many Timorese 
abandoned animism and became Christians. Today there are 
about 400,000 Catholics in East Timar. 
To ignore the religious tradition of the Timorese, even that of 
animism, and to attribute the same standing to Christianity as to 
other religions, is an attempt to destroy the people's beliefs. On 
the ethical and moral level the Timorese people live according to 
the principles of the Gospel and Christian morals. 
By accusing priests, arresting those who teach the catechism, 
banishing and slaughtering the Christians, they are attempting to 
put an end to the religious feelings of the people and, as a 
consequence, the identity of the Timorese people itself. 
3. Cultural identity 
"In general terms, the word culture means all things by which 
Man perfects and develops the multiple capacities of his mind 
and body; endeavouring by his study and efforts to master the 
world around him, making it more human through the progress 
of customs and institutions; and finally, in time, culture has 
become communication with others and preserves in its works 
the great spiritual experiences and aspirations so that they may 
. benefit many .people and even humanity as a whole" (GS 
No.53) .* 
The people of East Timor have their own way of expressing 
their feelings through legends, stories and traditions that are 
manifested in certain usages and customs. 
In contact with the Portuguese civilisation and under the 
influence of Christianity, this culture has taken on new forms and 
values of expression which provide the Timorese with a notion 
of their own historic identity. In short: there is a Timorese 
culture that is made up of words, attitudes, emotio~, reactions, 
behaviour, ways of being and seeing the world. It is in these 
things that the people recognise their own culture and in it their . 
own identity. They take pride in it and feel security in this 
background to their own future. 
All attempts to hinder or to prevent this evolution would be 
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an attack that the people of East Timor like any other people 
would find intolerable. 
The attempt to Indonesianise the Timorese people through 
powerful Pancasila (Indonesian State Ideology) Campaigns, 
schooling and media, by divorcing the people from their own 
weltansthauung, represents a slow assassination of the Timorese 
culture. To kill their culture is to kill the people themselves. 
faithfulness to the divine m1ss1on of the Church itself and 
absolute fidelity to the people to whom we were sent to procl~i~ 
Truth, Justice, Love and Human Dignity according to the spmt 
of the Gospel and the social doctrine of the Church. 
We appeal with the greatest urgency and energy for total 
respect for the fundamental human rights and ethnic, cultural 
and religious identity of the people of East Timor. 
"Rich or poor, each country has its own civilisation passed 
down from its forefathers with institutions required by earthly 
life and higher manifestations - artistic, intellectual and religious 
- of the spiritual life. When the latter possess true human values, 
then it is a great mistake to sacrifice them to the former. A 
people which gave its consent to this would lose the best of itself, 
it would sacrifice its own reason for living in the misapprehension 
that itwas seeking life itself. The words of Chri_st are also true for 
the peoples: What use is the whole world to a man, if he must 
lose his soul?" (PP Nr.40, Mt. 16.26)* 
We also appeal that conditions indispensable for an open, 
frank and fruitful dialogue between the different parties involved 
in the problem should be created, in which especially the People 
of East Timor, represented by the active movements, whether 
inside the country or abroad, should take part free from any 
form of coercion. 
Conclusion 
Notes 
The Apostolic Administrator and the 
Council of Priests of the Diocese of Dili 
Dili, January 1st, 1985 
Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo 
(Apostolic Administrator) 
These considerations and this judgement of conscience the 
Catholic Church in East Timor addresses to the Indonesian 
government. As we have previously mentioned, the motive 
behind this action is the awareness of a sacred duty of 
RH Encyclical "Redemptor Hominis" 
PP Encyclical "Populorum Progressio" 
GS Encyclical "Gaudium et Spes" 
Indonesia cries 'forgery' 
Soon after the Belo document became 
public, the Jakarta Post (11 May) claimed 
that the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta had re-
ceived a cable from Mgr Belo denying that 
he wrote a document on human rights vio-
lations in East Timor. This will not be the 
first time that the Papal Nuncio, Mgr Pablo 
Puente has come to the aid of the Indone-
sian government in a tight corner on East 
Timor. In 1982, the Papal Nuncio was 
given as the source for a claim in the In-
donesian press that the Vatican was of the 
opinion that the welfare of the people of 
East Timor would be best served by integ-
ration with Indonesia. 
A London-based Portuguese journalist, 
Gilberto Ferraz, writing in Jurnal de 
Noticias (19 May) categorically rejects the 
"forgery" claim. He describes the Belo 
document as "the best-prepared document 
ever to have come out of East Timor", and 
goes on: 
"From the carefully-prepared analysis 
and the many quotations from ecclesiasti-
cal sources, we have no doubt in identify-
ing it with someone well-versed and well-
placed in the Church and very close to the 
sufferings of the Timorese people." 
After quoting several passages to illus-
trate its authenticity, Gilberto Ferraz 
Fretilin prisoner in Tangerang 
There is, as far as we know, only one 
woman Fretilin prisoner among the many 
dozens who have been transported to Java. 
She is Dominggas da Costa, who is now 
being held in Tangerang Prison, West 
Java. 
Dominggas was born on 2 August 1958 
in Dili. While still at secondary school, she 
became an active member of Fretilin. She 
was just 17 when Indonesian troops at-
tacked East Timar. When they captured 
Dili, she ' left the capital like ·many other 
schoolboys and schoolgirls and went into 
the bush with Fretilin. Her whole family 
also went into the bush. After five years, 
she returned to Dili and succeeded in ob-
taining work with a sub-district head 
( camat) at the time of the population cen-
sus. After this job was completed, she 
managed to get a job as a teacher at No 12 
Primary School in Dili. It was while she 
was working at the school that she was ar-
rested, on 2 September 1982. Sixteen 
months later, in January 1984, she was 
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tried by the Dili District court. Nothing at 
all is known about the conditions under 
which her trial was held, who defended 
her, and the charges against her. After 
being found guilty and sentenced to six 
years, she spent the next few months at 
Comarca Prison in Dili and was then trans-
ported to Java on 17 May 1984. 
She was married for a short while, and 
has a daughter named Luisa Maria Peres. 
The little girl was with her for many 
months in Tangerang but was recently re-
turned to Dili with the help of the Interna-
tional Red Cross. 
A contact in Java writes: 
"Dominggas received her political edu-
cation in the course of practical experience 
out of which she developed the conviction 
that independence is the most cherished 
possession of any nation. She learnt that 
freedom is the most basic right, which is 
why Portuguese colonialism had to be 
swept away. At an early age already, she 
threw herself into the work of mobilising 
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writes: 
"With so much evidence as to the religi-
ous identity of the author of this document, 
having compared the typeface and ter-
minology used with other indisputably au-
thentic documents which carry clear means 
of identification, and examining also the 
literary expressions, the style of argument 
and the feelings it conveys, it is virtually 
impossible to describe this document as a 
forgery. We do not for a moment hesitate 
to identify this document with its real au-
thor, Mgr Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo or at 
least, but very remotely possible, to some-
one very close to him." 
Dominggas da Costa with her daughter, 
outside Tangerang Prison 
women while helping with logistics, and fi-
nally went with the guerrillas into the bush. 
After the resistance movement changed its 
tactics {in 1980, ed.) she returned to enemy 
territory to work as a school teacher. But 
Indonesian intelligence was well-experi-
enced and succeeded in breaking up many 
cells and rounding up the members." 
German MP: 
East Timor, a country 'in captivity' 
In an article entitled, "Everything func-
tions as if in captivity" (Der Spiegel, 29 
April) , the West German MP, Hans-Ulrich 
Klose , chairman of the Human Rights 
Committee of the Social Democratic party , 
who visited East Timor in March this year 
wrote that the Bishop of Dili, Mgr Belo has 
been under pressure to modify his state-
ment in a letter last year complaining that 
people in East Timor "suffer from disease , 
hunger, lack of freedom and persecution". 
"In our conversation , he repeated his com-
plaint: The Timorese are being brutally 
suppressed by their Indonesian 'bret-
hren"' . 
Population statistics suggest that there 
are some 150,000 Timorese missing since 
the start of the Indonesian invasion. Klose 
gave a local example of the dramatic fall in 
population. 
In Liquica district, east of Dili, there are 
about 34,000 people. According to the chair-
man of the local district council, the popula-
tion of the district was 46,000 in 1975. Today, 
there should be 50,000 (allowing for normal 
increase). Where are the rest? 
Klose and his delegation were permit-
ted to visit the concentration camp on 
Atauro isiand. When he asked why 
Timorese were being held captive there , he 
was told that they have relatives in the 
mountains with Fretilin freedom fighters . 
"This is enough to put them in custody. 
East Timor government, Mario Carras-
calao calls it 'necessary isolation'". For 
Klose this was "collective punishment in its 
most classic form". His article concludes 
with the following impressions of Atauro 
and East Timor in general. 
The International Committee of the Red 
Cross is doing everything possible to make 
life in the camp bearable in material terms , 
but the psychological conditions of the de-
tainees are catastrophic. The people only 
stare at you , lifelessly. They don't do any-
thing, they don't know anything. The au-
thorities never tell them what will happen to 
them, whether they will be allowed to return 
home to their villages . Can they hope for 
anything at all? The civilian camp official 
speaks ominously about "new" villages 
where it will be possible to keep watch over 
the captives. 
The overall impression throughout the en-
tire island is of a place in captivity. The 
people never smile , in stark contrast with In-
donesia's main island of Java where friendli-
ness shines. Here in East Timor, the people 
look stern , bitter , hostile and numb. They 
are a very different type of human being, our 
official escort explains. A very different kind 
of situation, he should have added for the 
sake of truth . 
Members of US congress to Reagan: 
'End Suffering in East Timor' 
A record 131 members of the US Con-
gress including Democrats and Republi-
cans addressed a letter on 26 April to Presi-
dent Reagan calling on him to include East 
Timor on his agenda during discussions 
with the leaders of the Portuguese govern-
ment during his visit to Lisbon. The letter 
also stressed that today "there is a com-
munity of East Timorese clergy and re-
fugees in Portugal, many of whom were di-
rect witnesses to the recent grim events in 
their homeland." 
Releasing the letter to the press on 8 
May, Congressman Tony Hall said: 
The plight of the East Timorese is very much 
the responsibility of che United States as long 
as we are supplying Indonesia with the very 
arms which are being used to suppress their 
rights. 
Pointing out that Portugal continues to 
pursue diplomatic initiatives regarding 
East Tim or, the legislators expressed the 
hope that "you will express to the leaders 
of Portugal your willingness to work to-
gether with them on proposals to bring an 
end to the human suffering in East Timor 
and to bring an authentic peace to East 
Timor." 
Portugal accuses the US of lack of 
neutrality 
The issue of East Timor was indeed raised 
during the Reagan visit, both when Reagan 
met President Eanes on the first day of his 
visit and during talks between Portuguese 
Foreign Minister Jaime Gama and Secre-
tary of State George Schultz. Press reports 
in Portugal quoted Jaime Gama as com-
plaining to his US counterpart that "the US 
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Prisoners at Atauro concentration camp. 
'A classic form of collective punishment.' 
(Der Spiegel, 29.4.85) 
does not know how to be neutral between 
Portugal and Indonesia regarding East 
Timor" . (Expresso , 18 May.) According to 
other sources, the Portuguese Foreign 
Minister regards US policy towards the 
current consultations as very pro-Indone-
sian , as reflected in its continuous support 
to Jakarta with military equipment regard-
less of its military operations in East 
Timor. 
Reprinted soon 
The first print of The War against East 
Timor is sold out. A reprint will be 
available soon. 
Published by ZE D Press . London. Price : £6 .95 
Special offer to TAPOL readers: 
Price : £4 . 50 plus postage 
Plus postage : £0 .75 UK, Europe. seamail 
£3 .00 ai rm ai l 
Send order with payment please to TAPOL, Sa Treport Street , 
London SWI 8 2BP. Please add £1 .50 to cheques not drawn on a 
London bank . 
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West Papua 
The 3 November incident in Vanimo 
When members of an Indonesian Verification Team visited the Vanimo refugee camp on 
3 November last year, they were physically attacked by refugees who refused to accept 
their presence and forced them to leave in a hurry. After the aborted visit, nine refugees 
were charged as "ringleaders". Six were acquitted and three were bound over. In the fol-
lowing account, Constantinopel P. Ruhukail, a refugee at Vanimo, explains the 
background. 
* * 
Before the visit, many meetings were held 
between representatives of the refugees 
and PNG government officials: 
On 27 October, six members of the camp 
Refugees Welfare Committee, Tom 
Ireeuw, John A . Wakum, Jimmy Wawar, 
Constantinopel P. Ruhukail, Jack Offide 
and Michael Kareth were summoned to the 
Foreign Affairs office in Vanimo to discuss 
preparations for a visit by an Indonesian 
delegation. The refugees wanted the visit 
cancelled because the safety of the Indone-
sians could not be guaranteed. They prop-
osed instead that a meeting should be held 
outside the camp, in Vanimo, between re-
fugee representatives and the delegation. 
PNG officials said this was not possible as 
the visit had already been agreed by the 
PNG and Indonesian governments. The re-
fugees suggested that a PNG government 
team should visit the camp to understand 
the refugees' antipathy towards the In-
donesian government. 
On 28 October, PNG government rep-
resentatives came to the camp to talk about 
the proposed visit . The refugees unanim-
ously rejected the visit and said that if the 
PNG government genuinely wanted a 
meeting between the refugees and the In-
donesian delegation, this would have to 
take place outside the camp, with rep-
resentatives of the refugees. 
* * 
officials Josef Dogore, a camp supervisor 
and Judas, of government intelligence, vis-
ited the camp. They tried to persuade the 
refugees to receive the delegation. The re-
fugees expressed their indignation and dis-
satisfaction with the PNG government's at-
titude. They repeated their antipathy to-
wards the Indonesian government, their 
refusal to accept a visit at the camp and 
again said they could not be held responsi-
ble for the safety of the delegation. 
On 3 November. Mr Dogore and Mr Judas 
visited the camp and told the refugees that 
officials from Foreign Affairs wanted to 
have a meeting with them, without explain-
ing the purpose. Suddenly, Mr Judas pul-
led out a pistol and, twirling it around, 
said: "There's no other choice; you must 
meet the Indonesian delegation". As he 
was speaking a convoy of cars with the In-
donesians entered the camp. The refugees 
quickly assembled and made their way to 
the Police Post to confront the delegation 
there. Bearing aloft the West Papuan flag 
and banners, the refugees approached the 
Indonesians who were heavily guarded by 
PNG security forces. The refugees 
quietened down to listen to the PNG gov-
ernment representative, Alan Oase, but 
when the head of the Indonesian delega-
tion, Sugiono, began with the words, "My 
brothers, countrymen ... " the refugees 
responded in fury. Mr Sugiono was not 
able to continue except to shout 
"Merdeka" (freedom). As the Indonesians 
moved back towards their vehicles, the re-
fugees became very emotional and moved 
in the direction of the Indonesians. The 
security forces started firing into the air 
and exploded tear gas cannisters, which 
only further infuriated the refugees who 
pressed on towards the vehicles . Some _of 
the Indonesians were struck and three, m-
cluded Mr Sugiono, were injured. 
On 5 November, nine refugees were ar-
rested: Constantinopel P. Ruhukail, 
Jehuda Sorontouw, Zadrach Affaar, 
Marthinus Jack Oropa, Herman Wanggai, 
Sepi Samonsabra, Daniel Toto, Theis On-
doafo, and Roy Nussy/Demotouw. They 
were held for one day and interrogated. 
After several postponements the trial com-
menced on 18 January. It lasted four days, 
and the defendants were defended by Mr 
Marthin Enda. The prosecution witnesses 
included three police officials, Laurenz Sa-
pian of Foreign Affairs, and Messrs Do-
gore and Judas. The six witnesses for the 
defence were Tom Ireeuw, John Wakum, 
Michale Kareth, Jimmy Wawar, Demianus 
Kurni and Jack Offide. 
During the hearings, it was shown that 
the fault lay with the PNG Government 
whose officials had refused to respect the 
views of the refugees. It was shown to the 
satisfaction of the court that the bloody in-
cident of 3 November would not have oc-
curred if the refugees' proposals made on 
27 October had been respected; that the 
refugees had wanted a meeting with the de-
legation outside the camp to avert trouble 
and protect PNG's good name but the 
PNG government had brought the In-
donesian delegation into the camp sud-
denly, without taking account of the sec-
urity situation there; that the PNG Gov-
ernment had failed to explain the purpose 
of the delegation's visit; and that the 
Foreign Affairs officials had acted dishon-
estly, had threatened the refugees and had 
failed to respect the refugees as Melane-
sians who suffered grievously as a result of 
colonisation. 
Six of the defendants were acquitted 
while three, Herman Wanggai, Daniel 
Toto and Roy Hussy were bound over and 
ordered not to engage in similar actions 
that could be harmful to the PNG Govern-
ment. 
On 29 October, PNG government officials 
again talked to the refugees about the visit, 
but the idea was again rejected. The offi-
cials then threatened that those who re-
jected the visit would be repatriated. In 
face of such threats, the refugees suggested 
two alternatives: the Indonesian delegation 
would be received but outside the camp, in 
Vanimo or another town in PNG; or, the 
Indonesian delegation could visit the camp 
but the refugees would not be responsible 
for their safety. The PNG government 
could not accept this. The visit would go 
ahead and any refugees who resisted would 
be returned to Indonesia. 
=-=-===========================-c~~~~~~~~ 
On 1 November. The Refugee Welfare 
Committee was given a list of 18 political 
leaders at the camp who would be taken to 
meet the PNG ambassador to Indonesia 
who was currently in the area. When the 
group of 18 arrived at the meeting place, 
they were confronted not by the ambas-
sador but by the Indonesian delegation. 
The 18 refugees accused the PNG officials 
of trickery, and left the meeting place in 
great anger. 
On 2 November, two PNG government 
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Renewed pressure on refugees to 
repatriate 
The Indonesian and Papua New Guinea governments are renewing efforts to bring about the large-scale repatriation of the ten thousand 
West Papuan refugees now living in camps along the PNG side of the border between the two countries. The first mm'e has been an attempt 
to "neutralise" some of the refugees alleged to be obstructing repatriation by banishing them to isolated places. 
The new Indonesian-PNG repatriation plan 
After months of apparent inactivity by Port Moresby and Jakarta 
on the refugee question following the incident at Blackwara 
Camp, Vanimo, last November (see separate item), the 
Indonesian-PNG Border Liaison Committee met in Port 
Moresby early in May and agreed on -a secret plan for 
repatriation: 
- The PNG government would step up military operations 
against OPM units &aid to be operating on the PNG side of 
the border. To this end, 200 members of the PNG Defence 
Force are believed to have been despatched to the border 
area to "round up" the OPM. 
- "Leading elements" at each of the refugee camps would be 
airlifted to Jayapura, capital of Irian Jaya, to be told about 
Indonesia's "generous" arrangements for all West Papuan 
refugees who agree to return. Once "convinced", these 
people would then be returned to the camps to facilitate 
repatriation. 
Both Port Moresby and Jakarta must realise that this plan is 
very unrealistic, primarily because of the strength of feeling 
among refugees against repatriation as long as Indonesia remains 
in control of West Papua. Airlifting "leading elements" can only 
mean forcing people to return to Jayapura, while PNG 
connivance in such a move would not only meet with strong 
resistance in the camps but would also face public condemnation 
throughout PNG. 
Disclosure that such a plan was in the offing was first made in 
March when Gregory Mongi, spokesperson for the newly-
established Human Rights Association of PNG made public a 
confidential document of the PNG Foreign Affairs department, 
drafted in February. (The Australian, 21 March.) According to 
this document, PNG would select "target groups" of about 100 
refugees, chosen on the basis of their apparent willingness to 
return to Indonesia. 
A key part of the strategy was to separate leaders from their followers 
in the belief that it was these "big men" who dissuade refugees from 
returning. 
Mongi said that with secret plans of this kind there was no 
guarantee that people would be leaving PNG of their own will . 
(The Australian, 21 March.) 
Mongi also disclosed to The Australian that one well-known 
refugee leader, Tom Ireeuw, had been transferred from 
Blackwara Camp and sent to a camp in distant Oksapmin. 
It has since become clear that other refugees from Blackwara 
were taken away too. More recently, they have again been 
moved, this time to Telefomin, not far from Ok Tedi where a 
small new camp is believed to be under construction. Australian 
visitors investigating the refugee situation recently were told by 
PNG officials that they were not allowed to visit Telefomin. 
The three refugees now known to be at Telefomin are Tom 
Ireeuw, Jimmy Wawar and Constantinopel Ruhukail. Tom 
Ireeuw was formerly a lecturer in English at Cendrawasih 
University in Jayapura, and has frequently been interviewed by 
Austrialian press, radio and television about the conditions and 
attitudes of the refugees. He was on the Blackwara Refugees 
Welfare Committee and was among the group of spokespeople 
who tried unsuccessfully to convince the PNG authorities not to 
proceed with the planned visit of Indonesian officials to 
Blackwara last November. Jimmy Wawar and Constantinopel 
Ruhukail were also in the group, while both Tom and Jimmy 
testified on behalf of the refugees who were charged in 
connection with the November incident. 
The real reason for their banishment to Telefomin is not 
clear. Isolated from outside observation, there are fears for their 
safety. T APO L has been authoritatively informed however; that 
they were removed from Blackwara "to reduce the presence of 
those in the refugee camps who seem to have in a militant way 
influenced the refugees not to opt for repatriation" . This 
conforms precisely with the confidential document disclosed by 
Greg Mongi two months ago . 
Provincial premiers offer resettlement 
Semai Aitowai, the premier of Fly Province (also known as 
Western Province) which stretches from the central massif along 
the border down to the south coast, announced in April that his 
administration had agreed to the permanent resettlement of 
7 ,000 refugees in traditional style. These are Iongum-speaking 
people who have already been given land to allow them to settle 
and cultivate garden~ .' Iongum-speaking people cover territory 
on both sides of the border and comprise a distinct cultural group 
whose land is arbitrarily cut in two by the PNG-Indonesian 
border. 
Utula Samana, the premier of Morobe Province, on the 
northern coast to the east of Western Sepik (now Sandaun) 
Province, and Alexis Sarei, the premier of North Solomons 
Province, have also agreed to the traditional resettlement of 
refugees. 
These offers open the way to a permanent solution for the 
majority of refugees, though whether the provincial plans woulq 
need the official consent of the PNG government and whether 
this consent would be forthcoming is unclear. It leaves begging, 
however, the fate of the Blackwara refugees who are eligible for 
political asylum. · 
Legal action to protect the refugees 
Meanwhile, a prominent PNG lawyer, Bernard Narokobi has 
initiated legal proceedings on behalf of a group of refugees, Tom 
Ireeuw, Jimmy Wawar and Cory Ap, wife of the murdered 
Arnold Ap, to stop the PNG and Indonesian governments from 
sending them back to Indones.ia against their wishes. Narokobi is 
also a prominent member of the Melanesian Alliance, whose 
chairman, Father John Momis recently became a member of the 
Somare Government . 
The lawyer told the PNG Times (12 May) that he is asking the 
Supreme Court to rule on several questions: 
Whether certain government action or lack of action relating 
to the refugees is subject to the jurisdiction, power and the 
authority of the court. 
2 Whether certain government action or inaction relating to the 
rights, interests and welfare of the refugees is justifiable in a 
democratic society that has a proper regard for the rights and 
dignity of man. 
3 Whether the refugees have inter alia any constitutional, 
political, civil or legal rights and duties so long as they are 
residing in the country. 
The PNG Times (12 May) comments that while the case is 
pending before the Supreme Court, it is most unlikely that the 
PNG and Indonesian governments will repatriate the 10,000 
refugees. Meanwhile, Bernard Narokobi has warned: "If the 
government tries to remove the refugees before the hearing is 
over, I will apply for an injunction" . (UPI report in Jakarta Post, 
11 May.) 
Thus, although Jakarta and Port Moresby appear to be set on 
new efforts to repatriate refugees, these moves face determined 
efforts by provincial premiers, the Human Rights Association 
and members of the legal profession to safeguard the refugees 
against unlawful repatriation. 
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Guest column 
ABRI and Islam: 
a historical conflict 
According to the 1980 population census, 87% of Indonesians 
are registered as Muslims. More than 130 million people out of a 
population of 150 million regard themselves as part of the 
ummah , making Indonesia by far the largest Islamic country in 
the world with a Muslim community far more numerous than the 
ummah in the whole of the Middle East, the heartland of Islam. 
This makes it difficult for people to understand the hostile and 
often openly aggressive attitude of the Indonesian army towards 
Muslim political life in general. 
It is not possible to grasp the reality of contemporary 
Indonesia by judging people according to their formal beliefs. 
Especially in Java, the most densely populated island in the 
world and the centre of Indonesian state power, it would be 
wrong to consider the huge Muslim community as a 
homogeneous socio-cultural entity . In Central and East Java, the 
home of the ethnic Javanese, one can identify two major 
subcultural divisions. The santri piously practise the teachings of 
Islam while the abangan display marked syncretic inclinations; 
although the majority consider themselves adherents of Islam, 
their abangan belief is a strange mixture of pre-Islamic beliefs 
like Hinduism and Buddhism and elements of traditional 
Javanese mysticism. In the seventies, Suharto and his generals 
gave prominence to their abangan belief and refurbished its 
image by giving it a new name, aliran kepercayaan or stream of 
faith . Many generals believe that their aliran kepercayaan is the 
highest form of faith, standing above the other recognised 
religions. The santri regard this aliran kepercayaan as the 
systematic religion of the abangan. As for the abangan, when 
asked what their religion is, many simply call themselves "Islam 
statistik" because everyone is required to adhere to one of the 
five recognised religions, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Hinduism or Buddhism . 
Priyayi and santri during the Dutch and Japanese eras 
The aristocrats and bureaucrats of Javanese society are the 
priyayi, the ruling strata of the abangan. Because of their deep 
roots in ancient Javanese cultural and ritual practices, the priyayi 
are even more strongly inclined to embrace the aliran 
kepercayaan than lower-strata abangan. The upper priyayi were 
successfully integrated into the Dutch colonial administration 
and were given positions within the Inlands Binnenlands Bestuur 
(Indigenous Civil Service) while some of the lower priyayi were 
recruited to serve as non-commissioned officers in KNIL, the 
Dutch colonial army. Thus the priyayi class as a whole have their 
roots in administration, ruling and warfare. 
During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the status of 
these lower priyayi was greatly enhanced by their recruitment 
into PET A (Pembela Tanah Air or Defence of the Fatherland), 
the decentralised army of Indonesian recruits organised and 
groomed ideologically by Japanese warriors. These lower priyayi 
soldiers were systematically pampered and given strategic 
positions by the Japanese authorities. It is from this generation 
of PET A officers that practically all the military rulers of 
Indonesia today orginate - from Suharto to Yoga Sugomo, from 
Sudjono Humardani to Sarwo Edhie. 
By contrast, the santri community were able to develop their 
own traditions, virtually untouched by the Dutch colonial 
system. In big cities like Jogjakarta, Muslim merchants called 
kauman set up their own religious and economic centres 
clustered around the pesantren, boarding-schools for school-age 
santris. Pesantren were also established in the villages and have 
continued to be the social and cultural base of rural Muslims up 
to the present day. 
The first mass-based anti-colonial movement which came into 
being at the beginning of this century was the Serikat Islam . Its 
banner was green, signifying that opposition to colonialism at 
that stage was inspired by the Muslim spirit. Under Dutch rule, 
informal Muslim leaders and ulama (preachers) never enjoyed 
any of the privileges that were heaped on the priyayi. The 
standard Dutch attitude towards the Muslims was to leave them 
in peace as long as they busied themselves with religious 
activities. As soon as they began to involve themselves in social 
activity or set up their own political platform, brute force was 
used against them. The Dutch never drew the santri into the 
bureaucracy or the army; these were the preserves of the priyayi. 
During the Pacific War, the Japanese forces of occupation 
pursued a different and more positive policy towards the 
Muslims. To a limited degree , they succeeded in utilising some 
Muslim leaders for Japanese political aims but Japanese 
attempts to mobilise the Muslim community as a whole were 
unsuccessful. As former Japanese officer Captain Yanagawa has 
admitted, his efforts to recruit an Islamic military force named 
Hizbullah was a flop, while PETA, the abangan army with its 
priyayi officers was by contrast a resounding success. 
Abangan-Santri Relations during the Independence Struggle 
During the independence struggle (1945-1949), the 
contradictions between the abangan and santri came into the 
open. In the wake of the Japanese surrender, there were many 
attempts by local ulama together with other progressive forces to 
overthrow priyayi rule which was intensely despised because of 
its crass collaboration with the Japanese. These grassroots 
rebellions were crushed by the republican Indonesian Army 
which had grown out of its PET A predecessor. Once the 
Japanese occupation had ended, the Hizbullah began to prove 
themselves as a fighting force and came to blows with the 
Siliwangi Division of the Indonesian Army in West Java, 
creating further strains in the relations between abangan and 
santri. 
Right from the start , relations between the republican army 
and the Muslims were unfriendly and often hostile. The 
Hizbullah often took a much more principled and militant stand 
towards British and Dutch forces than the Indonesian Army. 
This was particularly so at the time of the Renville Agreement 
between the Republic and the Dutch in early 1948, after which 
the republican Siliwangi Division withdrew from West Java 
under the terms of the agreement while the Hizbullah militia 
refused to leave. When Siliwangi troops returned to the province 
after the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, the Hizbullah 
A pesantren classroom 
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took up arms against them, proclaiming that the Republic had 
ceased to exist in the area because their troops had abandoned 
the province. The bitter clashes that ensued between republican 
troops and the Hizbullah are now recorded in official Indonesian 
history as "a stab in the back" for the Republic from the 
Muslims . Official Indonesian history gives the same 
interpretation to the fighting that broke out between republican 
troops and militia under communist leadership in September 
1948. Such an interpretation of these two conflicts is based on a 
distortion of the facts. 
During the 1950s, many of the Hizbullah troops regrouped 
themselves as an anti-Republic movement and launched their 
Darul Islam movement which advocated the creation of an 
Islamic state. Meanwhile the Indonesian Republic evolved more 
and more into a priyayi-ruled state . Already during the period of 
Guided Democracy from 1957 (when martial law was 
introduced) up to 1965, the military priyayi were becoming 
dominant . Their pre-eminence became institutionalised once the 
"New Order" of the generals was installed in 1965. 
Santri Hopes Dashed 
After the military takeover in October 1965, large sections of the 
ummah rallied to the anti-communist slogans of the Indonesian 
military and joined in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of 
innocent peasants and workers of the abangan, PKl-affiliated 
mass organisations. Having made their contribution to the 
obliteration of the main political force standing in the way of all-
out army rule , Muslim leaders fully expected to be rewarded by 
the Army leaders with a share in the new power structure 
established in the Republic. Alas, the abangan generals had not 
the slightest intention of sharing power with Muslims, and they 
were driven back into obscurity. Their position would , as of old, 
remain that of an oppressed minority. 
One of the main threads in the present regime's policy 
towards the Muslims today is the domestication and de-
Islamisation of Muslim political life. Attacks on Muslim political 
and social activities by the country's military rulers have become 
a regular feature . Moreover, during the early years of military 
rule, the economic policy of the government, allowing foreign 
capital to invest freely struck deep into the social base of the 
small Muslim traders and businessmen. The Army's political 
vehicle, GOLKAR also developed an aggressive attitude 
towards Muslim political life, and developed its own so-called 
Muslim centres complete with pesantren and mosques, bribing 
and co-opting the weaker ulama. They also infiltrated their men 
into the Muslim political federation, the PPP, notably John 
Naro, the hoodlum who is the present chairman of the PPP. This 
political offensive has intensified the disquiet among many 
Muslims. 
Practically all the social and political upheavals since the 
1970s have carried a distinct Muslim label. Most of the student 
leaders responsible for the student upheavals in 1974 and 1978 
were Muslim. The brute force used by the regime against these 
movements further alienated many Muslims from the regime . In 
August 1982, the cleavage widened further when the military 
rulers decided to curtail political activity in a more 
institutionalised, "constitutional" way. The Pancasila-as-the-
sole-principle (azas tunggal) was made compulsory for all social 
and political organisations. The Pancasila, which is the 
quintessence of priyayi military ideology, has been forced down 
the throats of the entire Indonesian population. Muslims in 
particular regard this as an affront , as a threat to basic Muslim 
principles , with the result that Muslim leader.s have started 
raising their voices in protest against azas-tunggal. 
In the estimation of the generals, Muslim activism is regarded 
as a security threat. Since the bloodbath in Tanjung Priok last 
September, the accusations being levelled against Muslim 
activists have reached almost the same pitch of intensity as those 
levelled against "the communist threat" . According to the 
evaluation of the State intelligence agency, BAKIN after the 
Tanjung Priok massacre , four groups are identified as having 
contributed towards these events: former members of the 
communist party, Muslims trying to establish an Islamic state, 
professionals, intellectuals , students , retired military men and 
others striving to overthrow the government in the name of 
Pancasila , and human rights activists. 
Priyayi rule during the past twenty years has developed a 
policy towards the Muslims that bears a striking resemblance to 
the patterns of official behaviour during the Dutch colonial era: 
Never give Muslims the opportunity to develop into a social 
force for change. As Jong as Muslims keep themselves busy with 
their religious affairs , the military rulers will promote such 
activities by means of subsidies for the construction of new 
mosques and pesantren. 
Although a large number of Muslims have been won over by 
these gestures, Islamic political life cannot be curbed so easily by 
such forms of bribery. A new generation of Muslim radical 
thinkers with strong democratic convictions are likely to persist 
in their opposition to the military dictatorship now in power in 
Indonesia . 
Liem Soei Liong 
ABRI unearths a 'Shiite niovenient' 
A bomb explosion on board a bus in Banyuwangi, East Java, 
which occurred on 15 March has led to a number of arrests, in-
cluding a Muslim leader accused of "Shiite" beliefs. 
The explosion killed seven passengers including three per-
sons believed to have been carrying the bomb. The three "sus-
pects" were Nasir and Hamsyah both from Malang, East Java, 
and Hakim from Tulungagung, East Java. According to East 
Java military spokesperson, Lieutenant-Colonel Sonny Ban-
sono, the bomb was not intended to blow up the bus but was 
being taken to Bali to be used to blow up a tourist attraction . 
The East Java military commander, Major-General Sularso, has 
linked this incident with bombs which exploded just before 
Christmas near a church in Malang and the explosions which de-
stroyed part of the Borobudur historical monument in Central 
Java. 
On 23 April, Major-General Sularso convened a closed meet-
ing with leading religious figures in the province to discuss strong 
measures against an "extremist" group said to be operating in 
East Java, and allegedly called "Kelompok Islam Fundamentalis 
Syiah" (Islamic Fundamentalist Shiite Group). It is not unlikely 
that this name is an Army creation, following their attempt sev-
eral years ago to create names like "Komando Jihad". 
Shortly before the 23 April meeting, a top figure in the Mus-
Jim organisation , Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), Kyai Haji As'ad 
Syamsul Arifin had a two-hour meeting with armed forces com-
mander, General Benny Murdani, during which they agreed that 
speedy action must be taken to stop all activities of the "Syiah 
movement" in Indonesia. The NU has its main power base in 
East Java. Since its congress earlier this year when it decided to 
abandon political activities, its relations with the military au-
thorities have greatly strengthened. Joining forces with the 
Army against alleged Shiites is hardly non-political. 
Following the NU-Murdani talks , it has been announced that 
in addition to the arrest of persons suspected of involvement in 
the bomb blast in Banyuwangi, the leader of the Yayasan Pen-
didikan Islam (Islamic Education Foundation), Husein Al-Hab-
syi, from Bangil has also been taken into custody. He is a well-
known critic of the government's chauvinistic tendencies as re-
flected, for example , in the repeated use of the song "Pandamu 
Negeri" ("To you, my country") . Husein Al-Habsyi does not, 
however, regard himself as a Shiite .,ut as a Sunni, like the vast 
majority of Indonesian Muslims. (Tempo, 4 May) 
Although the military authorities would not reveal whether 
they knew anything concrete about Husein Al-Habsyi's alleged 
links with the bus bomb incident, he is apparently regarded as 
the "brains" behind the affair. 
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The reorganisation of the 
Indonesian armed fore es 
The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) is entering the final stage of a major overhaul by drastically changing its territ~rial structur~. 
According to the two top leaders, ABRI commander, General Benny Murdani and the Chief of Staff, General Rudini, the ':'-am thrust of thzs 
organisation is to improve the efficiency of the Armed Forces to meet the needs of the remaining years of the twentieth century. The 
reorganisation, the biggest since 1969, will not be completed until April 1986. 
For the first time in its history, ABRI leadership is no longer 
in the hands of the "old generation", the generation that was 
involved in the so-caUed independence struggle from 1945 to 
1950. With the exception of a few leftovers, the "1945 
generation" have retired and their positions have been taken 
over by officers who entered the Armed Forces in the 1950s and 
196&. The two ABRI leaders, Murdani and Rudini belong to 
the so-called "bridging generation", men who were in their teens 
during the 1945-50 period and who acquired their professional 
training in the early 1950s. The first task for these two generals 
has therefore been to develop a new set of criteria for leadership 
in the new structure. 
In previous structures, the main criteria for judging an 
officer's capabilities were squeezed into a formula known as 
Berjuang Terus Menerus (BTM) (Continuous Struggle). 
Professionalism was not considered the most important asset for 
an officer; more basic was the attitude and experience of the 
officer regarding the "spirit of 1945". Murdani now explains that 
the BTM criteria will be replaced by a new set of criteria called 
"profesionalisme dan kejuangan" (professionalism and fighting 
attitude). Although the difference between this and BTM is not 
very clear as they both use as their .bedrock the claim that the 
military must play the leading role in society, the shift towards 
professionalism can be regarded as a new feature. According to 
Murdani's criteria, an officer should be a well-qualified 
professional soldier, whereas with the earlier generation, 
"involvement" in the independence struggle was sufficient to 
guarantee a successful military career. 
The social and political role of officers 
The word "kejuangan" which has now become a much-used 
army term legitimises ABRI's role in society. Another term for 
"kejuangan" is the social and political role of officers, usually 
abbreviated to "sospol" . Whereas in the past, in military jargon, 
ABRI was regarded as "part of society", having its origins as a 
"people's army", the new generation of army officers will be 
required to prove that they are fit to perform their "sospol" 
duties. General Rudini has made plans for the new batch of 
officers to acquire these qualifications by taking "kejuangan" 
exams. 
Once they have proved themselves capable of leading army 
units and mastering territorial affairs, a selected batch of officers 
will be "dropped" by ABRI general staff into Parliament (DPR) 
to serve a term as MPs. The hundred seats in the DPR allocated 
to ABRI will be used as a "test case" to assess these officers' 
ability to "mingle" with civilians. After serving as MPs for 
several yers (apparently not for a full parliamentary term of 5 
years), the officer's performance will be assessed. Provided he 
comes up to scratch, he will receive a new assignment in the 
territorial structure. 
According to Rudini, these "dropped" officers will gain 
experience in dealing with political affairs and resolving political 
issues. This parliamentary "pitstop" will serve two purposes, 
sho\ving officers how to "deal" with civilian affairs and 
constituting an integral part of the career of the future batch of 
ABRI leaders. 
As part of their rejuvenation programme, Murdani and 
Rudini have created an atmosphere of bidding the "generation 
of 1945" farewell. They continually promise the young officers 
that a bright future awaits them as the "old hands" depart from 
the scene. In May this year, Rudini announced that retired Army 
Six of the new-style regional military commands being installed. 
(Sinar Harapan, 9 April, 1985) 
officers who still occupy seats in the DPR and in the provincial 
assemblies (DPRD) will be replaced by younger men who are 
still on active service. And by moving younger officers into the 
top echelons of ABRI, Murdani and Rudini hope to create a 
sound basis for the continuation of the military regime. 
The recent appointment of two of the first graduates of the 
Military Academy in Magelang in 1960 onto the General Staff 
reflects the determination of Murdani and Rudini to implement 
their rejuvenation programme. Both men, Major-General Edi 
Sudradjat, 47 years, who has been appointed Operations 
Assistant, and Major-General Soegiarto, 49 years, who has been 
appointed Personnel Officer, have had years of experience in the 
elite troops. Sudradjat served as a "red beret" paracommando 
(RPKAD) while Soegiarto spent the early years of his army 
career in KOSTRAD, the Army Strategic Reserve Command. 
Murdani's confidence in them grew because of their combat 
experience in East Timor which also assured them much quicker 
promotion than usual. 
The new territorial structure 
Another important feature of the reorganisation is the major 
overhaul of the territorial structure. The seventeen KODAMs 
(Regional Military Commands) have now been reduced to nine 
plus a tenth for the capital, Jakarta. The upper tier known as 
KOWILHAN (Area Defence Command), created in 1969 by 
Suharto as a buffer betweeen headquarters and the KODAMs is 
being dissolved. This will shorten the line of command and 
eliminate a structure that Murdani now regards as superfluous. 
The new structure is almost identical to the structure from 1950 
till 1958, before the KODAMs were introduced. Both Murdani 
and Rudini stress that the new structure will mean major cuts in 
routine expenditures. 
Under the previous structure, the KODAMs were 
territorially equivalent to the provinces, but now they are "island 
oriented". In Rudini's words, "Islands are the components of 
national defence". A lot of emphasis will be placed on 
consolidating the 40 KOREMs (Regional Military Commands) 
which come immediately below the KODAMs. 
Rudini repeatedly assures the younger officers that they have 
nothing to worry about as regards their future careers because 
the new structure will provide sufficient opportunities to climb 
up the military ladder. But previous ABRI reorganisations have 
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always brought unrest among officers. By slimming down the 
KODAMs, there will be fewer positions for middle-ranking 
officers, though Rudini is at pains to convince the colonels and 
lieutenant-colonels that they need not worry about promotion 
and positions . 
The new territorial structure will continue to serve the same 
purposes as in the past in keeping a grip on society, but it will 
also be responsible for a more extended implementation of the 
Hankamrata (Total People 's Defence) programme for training 
civilians and incorporating them into para-military duties . This 
foreshadows a more systematic militarisation of public life at all 
levels of society. 
Elite troops given pride of place 
Of prime importance in the 1985 reorganisation is the further 
consolidation of ABRI's elite troops. Murdani has always been 
obsessed with acquiring the most advanced weapons systems and 
equipment and upgrading the skills of the elite troops. 
The two strike forces will be expanded and given the name 
"Komando Utama" (Prime Command) . This will consist of 
KOSTRAD, the Strategic Reserve Command, and KOPASSUS 
or Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Troops Command), 
which is the new name for the notorious red-beret units . They 
will both be designed to become units capable of operating at 
short notice anywhere in the archipelago. Their mobility will be 
greatly enhanced by being held combat-ready at all times 
through massive air-lifts, capable therefore of dealing with 
internal "unrest" with the minimum of delay. Last year, a special 
unit was created, called Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat (PPRC) 
or Rapid Deployment Force, in the tradition of the US Rapid 
Deployment Force or Britain's SAS units. 
These strike forces will add enormously to the military 
budget, and when Murdani insists that the reorganisation is 
aimed among other things at economies, what he means is that 
by trimming the territorial structure and introducing other 
austerity measures the money will be found to fund these far 
better equipped elite troops. 
Many retired officers have shown anxiety for the future of 
ABRI's dedication to its prime doctrine, the Dwifungsi (Dual 
Function) doctrine, which has been the cornerstone of military 
rule for the past twenty years. The ideological framework for the 
legitimacy of military rule has been boosted by ABRI ideologues 
who claim that since the Middle Ages, warriors and military men 
have always been the leaders of the nation . 
In reply to the misgivings of the retired officers, Murdani 
speaks confidently about a new breed of officers more capable 
than former generations to fulfil their role as leaders . Murdan! 
repeatedly claims that he is paving the way for a highly-
professionalised Armed Forces, confident of their destiny as 
leaders and therefore far superior to professional armies trained 
only to follow the commands and instructions of an elected 
government. The Indonesian military , whether already retired 
or in active service, are all in the same tradition, convinced of 
their uniqueness on this planet, and destined to rule . Despite the 
differences of emphasis between the older and younger 
generations over the question of professionalism and ABRI's 
"sospol" duties , they all uphold the Dwifungsi doctrine and are, 
alike, the major obstacle to democracy in Indonesia . 
Thatcher pledges more support for Indonesia 
"Our cultures are different", said British 
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher at a 
dinner held in her honour by President 
Suharto on the first day of her visit to In-
donesia in April, "but when it comes to de-
fending independence and freedom, we are 
at one with you". 
Having expounded such views, it was 
hardly surprising that Mrs Thatcher did not 
use the occasion of her visit to raise any of 
the many human rights violations that were 
brought to her notice by groups in Britain · · 
before her departure for Jakarta. She did 
raise the question of East Timar but asked 
Suharto "for more information to clarify 
reports critical of Indonesian conduct in 
East Timar" . (Daily Telegraph, 11 April.) 
In other words, what she needed was argu-
ments to cope with the critics back home. 
President Suharto obliged by telling her 
that, as she later quoted him, "the Interna-
tional Red Cross (ICRC) not only has ac-
cess to East Timar but is welcome there". 
This distorts the reality which is that since 
July 1983, the month before the Indone-
sian Armed Forces launched a new offen-
sive in East Timar, the ICRC has been pre-
vented from conducting much-needed re-
lief work throughout mainland East Tim or. 
UK to help strengthen Indonesia's navy 
and air force 
The Thatcher visit was focussed primarily 
on strengthening collaboration in the 
spheres of defence and industrial develop-
ment. The highlight was a visit to the Nur-
tanio aircraft company in Bandung, the 
centre-piece of Indonesia's industrial-milit-
ary complex. Mrs Thatcher made a point of 
stressing that collabora'tion in the defence 
and aerospace industries is already well 
under way, not only in the supply of goods 
but in the transfer of technology. Unlike 
many other western countries, the UK 
does not yet have a technical co-operation 
agreement with Nurtanio but this will be 
remedied when Nurtanio's President-Di-
rector, B.J. Habibie visits London in June 
this year. 
It was also during her visit to Nurtanio 
that Mrs Thatcher declared that Britain is 
ready to help strengthen Indonesia's navy 
and air force. The UK has already supplied 
Indonesia with several squadrons of Hawk 
ground-attack aircraft and three naval fri-
gates, besides a recent deal for the supply 
of £100 million worth of Rapier missiles. 
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Britain's economic interests in Indonesia 
It was announced at the time of the 
Thatcher visit that British capital invest-
ments in Indonesia currently amount to 
£600 million, the eighth largest. But British 
capital also reaches Indonesia through 
Hongkong-based companies and Hong-
kong ranks second after Japan , and ahead 
of the USA. (This information was con-
tained in an interview with Alan Donald , 
British ambassador in Jakarta, in Kompas, 
4 April, and would certainly exclude in-
vestments in the oil industry.) 
UK-Indonesian trade ties have also 
grown substantially in the 1980s. Since 
1980, the volume of trade has doubled. 
Britain's exports to Indonesia amounted to 
£187 million in 1984, while imports were 
worth £181 million . 
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Pancasila democracy in action 
TAPOL Bulletin No 68, March 1985, published a report from 
Tempo about the candidate in a village-chief election in Marihat 
Raya Village, Simalungun District, North Sumatra, who was 
disqualified because his deceased brother-in-law was a member 
of the leftwing union of teachers before 1965. More recent press 
reports help fill in a few details about election processes in the 
Indonesian countryside. 
* Kompas (25 March) reported that the Marihat Raya Village 
Election Committee has decided that all 499 villagers who 
voted for the disqualified candidate will b.e questioned and 
investigated. The bupati (district chief) of Simalungun said 
they would all be asked to explain why they supported the 
former village chief. The disqualified candidate Sabat Gultom 
would also be asked to explain why he persisted in 
campaigning even though he had failed to obtain the 
necessary political clearance because of the political 
affiliations of his deceased brother-in-law. 
* The bupati denied reports circulating that he has family ties 
with the man whose nomination was confirmed by the 
Election Committee. It is quite untrue, he said, that Sabat 
Gultom's candidacy was rejected because he was related to 
the other candidate. 
* In a letter to Kompas (27 March), the public relations official 
of the Simalungun District set out the procedure for adoption 
of candidates in any village-head election: 
1. Each candidate must go before a Committee for 
Nominations and the Conduct of the Election, then before a 
Control Committee at the sub-district level, and then the 
Investigation and Testing Committee, for provisional 
adoption as a candidate. 
2. Before any nomination can be accepted, each candidate 
must pass through three levels of screening: administrative 
examination of the documents, a clearance test by the Social-
and-Political affairs (sospol) Department Head of the North 
Sumatra Provincial Government who submits the nomination 
for consideration to the Social-and-Political Affairs Head of 
the sub-district government in question, and finally a general 
knowledge test. Prospective candidates can be disqualified at 
any of these stages. 
Sabat Gultom was disqualified at the second stage because 
of his (deceased) brother-in-law's membership of a banned 
PKI organisation as a result of which he failed to obtain a 
"Cleanliness Certificate". 
The letter claims that since Sabat Gultom's candidacy was 
disqualified, he could not have an election symbol. Anyone 
voting for the second symbol that appeared during the election 
was wrong to think they were voting for Gultom; they were just 
voting against the single candidate. Since more people voted 
against the single candidate (499) than for him (420), the election 
was declared null and void and will have to be repeated. The 
election will take place after the villagers have been told the true 
facts about Sabat Gultom and warned of the latent danger of the 
PKI. 
Village election in progress 
On 21March1985, Sinar 
Harapan published 
photographs of a village 
election in progress in 
Jatimakmur Village, 
Bekasi, five kms from 
Jakarta. 
Upper left: Villagers enter a gate decorated with the photograph of the single candidate, Abdul Madjid. 
Upper right: Voting forms are handed out, with Ham1ip (civil guard) officers at hand to keep an eye on things. 
Lower left: Voters leaving the polling booths, again under the watchful eye of Hansip. 
Lower right: The single candidate sits enthroned, with snacks and cigarettes to keep him going. The future village head will remain on hi 
regal perch until the election is over. s 
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Book review 
David Jenkins: Suharto and His Generals, 
Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983. 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Mono-
graph Series, 1984. 
The July 1977 general elections in In-
donesia came as something of a shock to 
the country's military rulers. On the face of 
it, there was nothing to worry about. The 
percentage of votes "won" by the Army's 
political party, GOLKAR (Golongan 
Karya or Functional Groups) had hardly 
slipped at all, down from 62.8% in 1971 to 
62.18% in 1977. GOLKAR and the Armed 
Forces (ABRI) would still control 332 out 
of the 360 contested seats in Parliament 
plus 100 seats automatically occupied by 
ABRI appointees. In the upper chamber, 
the MPR, ABRI and GOLKAR together 
would occupy 792 out of the 920 seats. But 
a dent had been made in GOLKAR's un-
beatable image. it had lost 4 seats by com-
parison with 1971 and the Muslim PPP 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or De-
velopment Unity Party) had gained five. 
Moreover, the PPP had actually topped the 
polls in two provinces, Aceh and Jakarta 
and scored convincing victories in a 
number of districts in both Java and 
Sumatra. 
It was an open secret that GOLKAR's 
. victory was the result of widespread intimi-
dation, vote-rigging and all the inbuilt ad-
vantages for GOLKAR at every stage of 
the election process. No less a man than 
General Sumitro who was Deputy Com-
mander of the all-powerful army security 
command, KOPKAMTIB in 1971, was 
later to admit: 
If you had left it to GOLKAR in 1971, with-
out any interference by ABRI, the Muslim 
parties would have won. I can assure you of 
that! Oh yes! Seventy-one! Seventy-seven! 
Without the help of ABRI, PPP would have 
won. And won a majority! 1 
The realisation had also spread that the 
Army's decision to force the Muslim par-
ties in 1973 to merge into a single party, 
with the intention of undermining these 
parties and plunging them into internal 
feuding, had been a "tactical blunder" . 2 
The results had raised grave doubts about 
the government's decision to allow the PPP 
to use the Ka'abah (the sacred stone in 
Mecca) as its election symbol as it had 
proven to be "an effective symbol for the 
mobilisation of Islamic voters". 3 
But the electoral setback was not the 
only sign of trouble. University campuses 
had been in turmoil twice during the de-
cade. The Sawito affair4 in 1976 had deli-
vered a shock to the system. Criticism of 
corruption was becoming more outspoken, 
and there were other signs of organised dis-
affec~ 
Nowhere was the consternation about 
these developments greater than among 
the generals inside and outside the upper 
echelons of power, among them generals 
who had fallen foul of Suharto for one 
reason or another since 1965. Many among 
them felt that the regime was using the 
wrong tactics to legitimise its rule . They 
were beginning to question Suharto's par-
ticularly crude implementation of Indone-
sian-style militarism known as the 
dwifungsi or dual function, the doctrine 
proclaiming the Army's divine right to play 
a social and political as well as a defence 
role . The internal controversy that broke 
out in 1978, involving active-duty as well as 
retired generals , focussed on two ques-
tions: whether ABRI should stand above 
all political forces rather than support 
GOLKAR up to the hilt as it had been 
doing since 1968 , and whether it was not 
guilty of excesses in its implementation of 
the socio-political side of the dwifungsi be-
cause military personnel were now 
dominating the executive, the legislature, 
the judiciary as well as the regional and 
local government apparatus right down to 
the villages, and much else besides. 
General Yoga Sugomo, intelligence chief 
In Suharto and His Generals, David 
Jenkins describes and analyses this con-
troversy with the help of numerous inter-
views and many spicey "confidential com-
munications" from most of the pro-
tagonists. As the author shows, none of the 
men involved questioned the need, indeed 
the right, of ABRI to run the country. This 
effectively demolishes his attempt to dif-
ferentiate betwen the "pragmatist" gener-
als - Suharto and his inner core of intelli-
gence and security generals who constantly 
bend the rules (which they drew up) to suit 
themselves and safeguard Army rule - and 
the "men of principle" who believe that 
ABRI should "take a more enlightened 
and indulgent view of Indonesian society 
and yield up a good deal of its control" . 5 
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The biographical notes which he provides 
as each general enters the scene, making 
the book a very useful resource about pre-
sent-day Indonesia, shows each one of 
them to have been pragmatists time and 
again during their own long and bloody 
military careers, not least General Nasu-
tion, the leading figure on the side of "prin-
ciple". 
The controversy produced a number of 
documents. The first came from SES-
KOAD, the Army's Staff and Command 
School, and it criticised the dwifungsi as 
currently being implemented. The second 
which had much the same message, carried 
the imprimatur of General Widodo who 
had been appointed Army Chief of Staff in 
1978 and who soon afterwards fostered a 
group known as Fosko (Forum for Study 
and Communication) composed of an 
array of "has-been" generals from the 
three Army divisions in Java as well as 
from the Air Force and the Navy. The 
doubters gathered in Fosko also seemed to 
enjoy the sympathy of General Jusuf who 
was appointed Defence Minister in 1978 
and spent much of his time careering 
around the country, strengthening ABRI's 
"links with the people" and proclaiming its 
neutrality in any political contests. He 
seemed to be saying that his territorial 
troops had far more important things to do 
than devote much of their time to winning 
elections for GOLKAR. 
The dispute was allowed to rumble on 
until Suharto publicly entered the fray in a 
speech in March 1980 when he made a 
number of things abundantly clear. ABRI 
certainly has a political partner, GOL-
KAR. ABRI will countenance no chal-
lenge to Pancasila, a remark specifically di-
rected at the Muslims, some of whom had 
walked out of the 1978 MPR session which 
was discussing further sanctification of the 
hallowed Pancasila . ABRI (ie. Suharto) 
regards criticism of the "national leader-
ship" (ie. Suharto) as an offence against 
the Pancasila. And finally, that it is ABRI's 
abiding duty to prevent anyone from trying 
to amend the Constitution or replace Pan-
casila. Hence the need for ABRI to control 
with its own appointees one-third of the 
seats in the MPR, quite apart from the 
massive number of GOLKAR representa-
tives assuring the regime a comfortable 
working majority of 89%. With one-third 
of MPR seats in ABRI's hands, all it 
needed to do, said Suharto, was to kidnap 
one non-ABRI MPR member if it wanted 
to prevent any constitutional changes from 
obtaining the required two-thirds majority. 
After Suharto's intervention, there was 
little more to be said except to spell out the 
regime's views in full. A third document 
appeared in 1981 which became known as 
the Hankam (Defence Department) 
Paper. 6 This provided the historical justifi-
cation for the dwifungsi , written by Army 
historian Nugroho Notosusanto, plus three 
other papers spelling out the reasons for 
ABRI's deep and everlasting involvement 
in social and political affairs. The reasons 
for its special partnership with GOLKAR 
were also reiterated. 
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General Jusuf was left looking rather 
foolish , having publicly taken the view of 
the other side . But, as Jenkins shows, Jusuf 
hardly seemed to be in charge of his own 
department anyway. Admiral Sudomo, the 
Deputy Minister and a loyal supporter of 
Suharto since the days of confrontation 
with the Dutch over West Papua, (who 
General Widodo described as a "watch-
dog") turns out to have been the man 
really in charge. Regardless of what Jusuf 
was saying or doing, Sudomo, who was 
concurrently commander of KOPKAM-
TIB , had his own line of communication 
upwards to Suharto and downwards to the 
provincial commanders as KOPKAMTIB 
executive officers. In fact, Sudomo was 
secretly (sic) assuring commanders on 
Suharto's behalf that "nothing had really 
changed" and that, come the next election, 
ABRI would again be called on to make 
sure that GOLKAR won .7 It was Sudomo 
too who, at a private meeting of the GOL-
KAR Executive Council, was minuted as 
saying that ABRI is "absolutely GOL-
KAR", whatever Widodo or Jusuf might 
be saying. 
Besides this fascinating portrayal of 
intra-regime controversy, Jenkins also 
treats the reader to an account of how 
Suharto manages and manipulates his own 
inner core of officers. In the late seventies, 
there was only a tiny group of men whom 
he completely trusted and who held double 
and in some cases (Murdani) treble posts 
to make sure Suharto kept a grip on the 
three foci of power - the Defence Depart-
ment, KOPKAMTIB and the intelligence 
agency, BAKIN. 
Once the party line had been laid down, 
Fosko was disbanded and Widodo was re-
placed. Jusuf hung on till 1983, though 
"watchdog Sudomo" stayed around too. 
GOLKAR, not surprisingly, "won" the 
1982 elections and since then the process of 
further paralysing the political effective-
ness of the political parties, the PPP and 
the PDI has continued apace. Pancasila 
must now be everyone's "sole principle" 
and the PPP, a mere shadow of its former 
self, has been forced to replace the 
Ka'abah symbol with a safely neutral star. 
Some members of the Fosko group, 
shocked at the vigour of Suharto's re-
sponse, went public in a statement that 
came to be known as the Petition of 50. 
Since then, the group of "sakit hati" (dis-
gruntled) generals have found new chan-
nels to air their grievances against the re-
gime in coalition with disaffected civilian 
politicians. The Jenkins study has provided 
a very useful insight into the workings of 
military minds in Indonesia. Whatever 
their differences, they share the same fixa-
tion about "ABRI's role" and Army rule . 
Footnotes 
1 Jenkins, Suharto and his Generals, page 37. 
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· 6 The Hankam Paper was published as Pejuang 
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1984. 
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Publishers warned against LEKRA writers 
The Attorney-General's Office has issued a warning to the In-
donesian Publishers Association, IKAPI, against the publication 
of books written by former members of LEKRA, the organisa-
tion of cultural workers that was banned by the military in 1965 
along with many other leftwing organisations. 
The warning follows the decision earlier this year to ban a 
book about General Soedirman, largely because of an article in 
it by Professor Poeradisastra, a LEKRA member (see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 68, March 1985). 
The Attorney-General's warning, marked secret and dated 13 
February 1985, which is accompanied by a full list of the names 
of members of the Central Council and Secretariat of LEKRA, 
asks publishers to be alert of the possibility that LEKRA writers 
may try to have works published under pseudonyms. It reminds 
IKAPI of an Instruction issued by the Minister for the Interior in 
1981 which includes the following guidelines for "guidance and 
supervision" of former G30S/PKI detainees and convicted pris-
oners: 
e To impose restrictions on the employment of former G30S/ 
PKI detainees and convicts in the following professions: 
Jobs which can be used to influence others directly or indirectly 
for the advancement of communism, such as teachers, lecturers, 
priests, puppeteers, legal aid lawyers, journalists and so on . 
e To prevent social activities by former G30S/PKI detainees 
and convicts which could result in disturbances in social-political 
affairs, social-economic affairs, social-cultural affairs and na-
tional security and order. 
e To prevent the mental attitudes of former G30S/PKI de-
tainees and convicts from threatening and endangering the Pan-
casila ideology and the 1945 Constitution. 
The "Four Changes" 
The commander of the Tabanan Military District in Bali, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Panda Made Latra, has also warned people 
to exercise vigilance against former PKI detainees who, he 
claimed, are conducting a "four changes" tactic - change of 
name, change of domicile, change of profession and change of 
appearance. He added the warning that people of "the extreme 
left" are engaged in a variety of activities under the cloak of re-
ligion. (Sinar Harapan, 27 March) 
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